List of top Legal Studies Questions on Constitutional Laws asked in CLAT PG

The Supreme Court of India in a Suo Motu Writ Petition in Re: Distribution of Essential Supplies and Services During Pandemic, (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2021), analyzed the power of judicial review over the management of the COVID-19 pandemic in India.

The Union of India highlighted a few concerns: The executive is battling an unprecedented crisis and the government needs discretion to formulate policy in the larger interest and its wisdom should be trusted; the current vaccine policy conforms to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and requires no interference from the courts as the executive has room for free play in the joints while dealing with a pandemic of this magnitude; judicial review over executive policies is permissible only on account of manifest arbitrariness. No interference from judicial proceedings is called for when the executive is operating on expert medical and scientific opinion to tackle a medical crisis; and any over-zealous judicial intervention, though well-meaning, in the absence of expert advice or administrative experience may lead to unintended circumstances where the executive is left with little room to explore innovative solutions.

The Court clarified that in the context of a public health emergency, the executive has been given a wider margin in enacting measures which ordinarily may have violated the liberty of the individual. The judiciary has also recognized that Constitutional scrutiny is transformed during such public health emergencies and noted the complex role of the government in battling public health emergencies in the following words:
“While this court should guard with firmness every right appertaining to life, liberty or property as secured to the individual by the Supreme Law of the Land, it is of the last importance that it should not invade the domain of local authority except when it is plainly necessary to do so in order to enforce that law. But even in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten and a public health emergency does not give Governors and other public officials carte blanche to disregard the Constitution for as long as the medical problem persists. … the courts should expect policies that more carefully account for Constitutional rights.”


The Court stated that separation of powers is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. However, this separation of powers does not result in courts lacking jurisdiction in conducting a judicial review of these policies.
The constitutional validity of the West Bengal Housing Industry Regulation Act, 2017 (WB-HIRA) was challenged on the basis that both WB-HIRA and a Parliamentary enactment, namely, the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) are relatable to the legislative subjects contained in Entries 6 and 7 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. WB-HIRA has neither been reserved for nor has it received Presidential assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, which was necessary since it was going to occupy the same field as the RERA, a law which had been enacted by the Parliament.

The State enactment contains certain provisions which are either directly inconsistent with the corresponding provisions of the Central enactment, or a virtual replica of the Central enactment; and Parliament having legislated on a field covered by the Concurrent List, it is constitutionally impermissible for the State Legislature to enact a law over the same subject matter by setting up a parallel legislation. The analysis indicates repugnancy between WB-HIRA and RERA. Undoubtedly, as Article 254(1) postulates, the legislation enacted by the State legislature is void “to the extent of the repugnancy”.

There is not only a direct conflict of certain provisions between the RERA and WB-HIRA, but also a failure of the State legislature to incorporate statutory safeguards in WB-HIRA, which have been introduced in the RERA for protecting the interest of the purchasers of real estate. For repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution, there is a twin requirement to be fulfilled: firstly, there has to be a “repugnancy” between a Central and State Act; and secondly, the Presidential assent has to be held as being non-existent.

The test for determining such repugnancy is to find out the dominant intention of both the legislations and whether such dominant intentions of both the legislations are alike or different. A provision in one legislation, in order to give effect to its dominant purpose, may incidentally be on the same subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation; but such partial or incidental coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a different purpose does not attract the doctrine of repugnancy. In order to attract the doctrine of repugnancy, both the legislations must be substantially on the same subject. Hence, WB-HIRA is repugnant to the RERA, and is hence unconstitutional.
The present system of appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and as elucidated in the Collegium system makes it clear that the first step is a recommendation from the Collegium of four senior-most judges and presided over by the Chief Justice. This process in turn requires wide consultation by the Chief Justice of the High Court to identify the requisite talent, so as to make the recommendations.

Contrary to some portrayed beliefs, as if this is an extremely subjective system, every Chief Justice is actually required to solicit names from different sources whether it be sitting judges, retired judges, or prominent members of the Bar. It is from this pool of talent that he selects, after a discussion in the collegium, the most suitable candidates. It is thus of utmost importance that the flow of recommendations continues for the appointment process to work successfully.

The current situation of vacancies, especially in some of the larger courts with very few recommendations in the pipeline, seems to be the genesis of this problem. The data placed before us, as drawn from the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG), shows that five (5) High Courts alone are responsible for 54% of the pendency of over 57,51,312 cases, i.e., the High Courts of Allahabad, Punjab & Haryana, Madras, Bombay, and Rajasthan. The Madras High Court has among the highest arrears in the country of 5.8 lakh cases despite having fewer vacancies than most other High Courts (i.e., 7%).

This does not take away from the requirement of appointing ad hoc Judges but supports the view that even if the existing vacancies are few, a situation may arise requiring the expertise of experienced Judges to be appointed as ad hoc Judges.
The constitutional validity of the West Bengal Housing Industry Regulation Act, 2017 (WB-HIRA) was challenged on the basis that both WB-HIRA and a Parliamentary enactment, namely, the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) are relatable to the legislative subjects contained in Entries 6 and 7 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. WB-HIRA has neither been reserved for nor has it received Presidential assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, which was necessary since it was going to occupy the same field as the RERA, a law which had been enacted by the Parliament. The State enactment contains certain provisions which are either: directly inconsistent with the corresponding provisions of the Central enactment; or a virtual replica of the Central enactment; and Parliament having legislated on a field covered by the Concurrent List, it is constitutionally impermissible for the State Legislature to enact a law over the same subject matter by setting up a parallel legislation. The analysis indicates repugnancy between WB-HIRA and RERA. Undoubtedly, as Article 254(1) postulates, the legislation enacted by the State legislature is void ‘to the extent of the repugnancy’. There is, not only a direct conflict of certain provisions between the RERA and WB-HIRA, but there is also a failure of the State legislature to incorporate statutory safeguards in WB-HIRA, which have been introduced in the RERA for protecting the interest of the purchasers of real estate. For repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution, there is a twin requirement to be fulfilled: firstly, there has to be a ‘repugnancy’ between a Central and State Act; and secondly, the Presidential assent has to be held as being non-existent. The test for determining such repugnancy is indeed to find out the dominant intention of both the legislations and whether such dominant intentions of both the legislations are alike or different. A provision in one legislation in order to give effect to its dominant purpose may incidentally be on the same subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation, but such partial or incidental coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a different purpose does not attract the doctrine of repugnancy. In order to attract the doctrine of repugnancy, both the legislations must be substantially on the same subject. Hence, WB-HIRA is repugnant to the RERA, and is hence unconstitutional.
The present system of appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and as elucidated in the Collegium system makes it clear that the first step is a recommendation from Collegium of four senior-most judges and presided over by the Chief Justice. This process in turn requires wide consultation by the Chief Justice of the High Court to identify the requisite talent, so as to make the recommendations. Contrary to some portrayed beliefs as if this is an extremely subjective system, every Chief Justice is actually required to solicit names from different sources whether it be sitting judges, retired judges, or prominent members of the Bar. It is from this pool of talent that he selects, after a discussion in the collegium, the most suitable candidates. It is thus of utmost importance that the flow of recommendations continues for the appointment process to work successfully. The current situation of vacancies, especially in some of the larger courts with very few recommendations in the pipeline seems to be the genesis of this problem. The data placed before us, as drawn from the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG) shows that five (5) High Courts alone are responsible for 54% of the pendency of over 57,51,312 cases i.e., the High Courts of Allahabad, Punjab & Haryana, Madras, Bombay, and Rajasthan. The Madras High Court has among the highest arrears in the country of 5.8 lakh cases despite having fewer vacancies than most other High Courts (i.e., 7%). This does not take away from the requirement of appointing ad hoc Judges but supports the view that even if the existing vacancies are few, a situation may arise requiring the expertise of experienced Judges to be appointed as ad hoc Judges.
The Supreme Court judgment in B. Singh v. Union of India, [(2004) 3 SCC 363] held, when there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, the said petition is to be thrown out. Public interest litigation (PIL) which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be ‘publicity interest litigation’ or ‘private interest litigation’ or ‘politics interest litigation’ or the latest trend ‘paise income litigation’. If not properly regulated and abuse averted, it may become a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreak vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of a knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. The expression ‘PIL’ means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking
Courts must be open both in the physical and metaphorical sense. Save and except for in - camera proceedings in an exceptional category of cases, such as cases involving child sexual abuse or matrimonial proceedings bearing on matters of marital privacy, our legal system is founded on the principle that open access to courts is essential to safeguard valuable constitutional freedoms. The concept of an open court requires that information relating to a court proceeding must be available in the public domain. An open court proceeding ensures that the judicial process is subject to public scrutiny. Public scrutiny is crucial to maintaining transparency and accountability. However, there are certain exceptions to the rule of open courts in India. While emphasising the importance of public trial, it cannot be overlooked that the primary function of the judiciary is to do justice between the parties who bring their causes before it. If a Judge trying a cause is satisfied that the very purpose of finding truth in the case would be retarded, or even defeated if witnesses are required to give evidence subject to public gaze, is it or is it not open to him in exercise of his inherent power to hold the trial in camera either partly or fully? If the primary function of the court is to do justice in causes brought before it, then on principle, it is difficult to accede to the proposition that there can be no exception to the rule that all causes must be tried in open court. The exceptions must be exercised with great caution and it is only if the court is satisfied beyond a doubt that the ends of justice themselves would be defeated if a case is tried in open court that it can pass an order to hold the trial in camera.
The right to self-determination and bodily integrity has been recognised by the Supreme Court of India. The right to execute an Advance Medical Directive is nothing but a step towards protection of the aforesaid right by an individual, in event he becomes incompetent to take an informed decision, in particular stage of life. It has to be recognised by all including the States that a person has right to execute an Advance Medical Directive to be utilised to know his decision regarding manner and extent of medical treatment given to his body, in case he is incapacitated to take an informed decision. Such right by an individual does not depend on any recognition or legislation by a State and we are of the considered opinion that such rights can be exercised by an individual in recognition and in affirmation of his right of bodily integrity and self-determination which are duly protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. The procedure and manner of such expression of such right is a question which needs to be addressed to protect the vulnerable, infirm and old from any misuse. It is the duty of the State to protect its subjects specially those who are infirm, old and need medical care. The duty of doctor to extend medical care to the patients, who come to them in no manner diminishes in any manner by recognition of concept that an individual is entitled to execute an Advance Medical Directive. The physicians and medical practitioners treating a person, who is incompetent to express an informed decision have to act in a manner so as to give effect to the express wishes of an individual.
Human liberty is a precious constitutional value; it is as tenuous as tenuous can be. Liberty survives by the vigilance of her citizens, on the cacophony of the media and in the dusty corridors of courts alive to the rule of (and not by) law. The doors of the court cannot be closed to a citizen who is able to establish prima facie that the instrumentality of the State is being weaponized for using the force of criminal law to the detriment of human liberty. The basic entitlement of every citizen who is faced with allegations of criminal wrongdoing, is that the investigative process should be fair. This is an integral component of the guarantee against arbitrariness under Article 14 and of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. The Supreme Court considered the given principle in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, [AIR 2021 SC 1], which binds that the courts must be alive to the need to safeguard the public interest while ensuring that the due enforcement of criminal law is not obstructed. The fair investigation of crime is an aid to it. Equally it is the duty of courts across the spectrum-the district judiciary, the High Courts and the Supreme Court to ensure that the criminal law does not become a weapon for the selective harassment of citizens. The inherent power of the High Court must be construed as an aid to preserve the constitutional value of liberty. The writ of liberty runs through the fabric of the Constitution. The need to ensure fair investigation of crime is undoubtedly important in itself, because it protects at one level, the rights of the victim and, at a more fundamental level, the societal interest in ensuring that crime is investigated and dealt in accordance with law. On the other hand, the misuse of the criminal law is a matter of which the courts in this country must be alive
Read the extracts of leading judicial pronouncement and answer the questions below:
1. What is bad in theology was once good in law but after Shariat has been declared as the personal law, whether what is Quranically wrong can be legally right is the issue to be considered in this case. Therefore, the simple question that needs to be answered in this case is only whether triple talaq has any legal sanctity. That is no more res integra. This Court in [1] has held, though not in so many words, that triple talaq lacks legal sanctity. Therefore, in terms of Article 141 [1] is the law that is applicable in India.
2. Having said that, I shall also make an independent endeavour to explain the legal position in [1] and lay down the law explicitly.
3. [2] was enacted to put an end to the unholy, oppressive and discriminatory customs and usages in the Muslim community. Section 2 is most relevant in the face of the present controversy.
Application of Personal law to Muslims. - Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions (save questions relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of Personal Law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties, and wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions and charitable and religious endowments) the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).
Read the piece written by Prof. Upendra Baxi and answer the questions below:
No matter how the matters are for the time being resolved (and swiftly on all indications), the present crisis in the Supreme Court involves mainly a contention on how judicial business should be conducted. The extraordinary movement of four justices in making public a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in November 2017, and assorted observations at the press conference last week are very unusual judicial happenings. At that conference, Justice Chelameswar said that “less than desirable things have happened” and the protesting Justices vainly “tried to collectively persuade” the CJI to take “remedial measures”. These happenings are now made even more unusual by Justice Ranjan Gogoi reportedly denying any “crisis|” and Justice Kurian Joseph saying the matter is now settled leaving little scope for “outside intervention”. However, the letter released at the press conference said otherwise; it spoke of the ways in which “the overall functioning of the justice delivery system”, the “independence of the high courts”, and the functioning of the office of the CJI have been “adversely affected”. A moving appeal to the Indian “Nation" was issued at the press conference and Justice Chelameswar justified speaking out, lest ”wise people" say later that they were complicit. A situation where four senior-most justices went public to express their discontent with the present CJI‘s exercise of authority to constitute Benches raises grave constitutional questions. Although only an in-house rectification can save matters, it is an anti-democratic error of grave proportions to think that co-citizens should have no interest, stake, or say in the matter. Undoubtedly, the Chief Justices, whether of the High courts or the Supreme Court, have the power to order the roster. The question is whether that power is coupled with a constitutional duty to follow certain conventions. Obviously, there are a few: Chief Justices have a primary duty of accountability to the Brother Justices, the Bar, and a general obligation through the Bar to the litigating public and people at large. But when a letter by four Senior Justices has been ignored for about two months, is going public with a copy of that letter and holding even a press conference unjudicial? On this question opinions are varied. Some have lauded this step as heroic while others regard this as "sheer trade union tactics‖ and some even say the step was extremely unfortunate but now some institutional solidarity should pave the path ahead. What are the other conventions? First, a part-heard matter may not be divested from the co-justices who are seized with it. Second, the CJI may not deny a request for recusal on grounds of conflict of interest. Third, the Chief Justice may not ignore the requests by co-justices to form a larger Bench. Fourth, a Chief Justice may not selectively assign sensitive or important cases to the same judges. However, fifth, it is doubtful whether there is, or ought to be, a convention requiring such matters to be heard only by the senior-most justices. No, because the decision to elevate a citizen to judgeship
must involve all relevant considerations; once elevated, a justice is co-equal to all other brethren. Sixth, it is true that co-equality occurs within a hierarchy: Not every justice becomes a Chief Justice, and the SC collegium must comprise the five senior-most justices. Outside this framework, the question about the rank-ordering may not arise; all Justices speak for the constitutional court. Any discussion about benches headed by “junior” justices is therefore injudicious. The second issue looming large is the finalisation of Memorandum of Procedure (MoP). In early July 2017 (in Justice Karnan‘s case), at least two Justices observed a need “to revisit the process of appointment of judges and establishment of a mechanism for corrective measures other than impeachment”. The letter also suggests that the issue of MoP "cannot linger on for indefinite period" and since the government has not responded to the MoP sent as far back as March 2017, the Court must now presume this long “silence” amounts to acceptance. Convening a full court and/or an agreement of the Chief Justices‘ conference stand was suggested. The highest court in the land cannot endlessly wait for the government. The remedies of impeachment and removal for judicial misconduct and review, and now curative jurisdiction, constitutionally exist. And further, the spectre of the call of conscience to go to the  “Nation” will now haunt all Chief Justices. Informed criticism has some impact on judicial dispositions. But the ultimate guarantee of fairness as justice lie with the Justices themselves. As Eugene Ehrlich, a founder of European sociology of law, said: “The best guarantee of justice lies in the personality of the judge.” Justices must be seen practising what they preach to the other holders of public power. It is only when they collectively fail to do so that a democracy is truly imperilled.
The requirement of balancing various considerations brings us to the principle of proportionality. In the case of K. S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) (supra), this Court observed: “310…Proportionality is an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary State action because it ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law...” Further, in the case of CPIO v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, [(2019) SCC OnLine SC 1459], the meaning of proportionality was explained as: "225. It is also crucial for the standard of proportionality to be applied to ensure that neither right is restricted to a greater extent than necessary to fulfil the legitimate interest of the countervailing interest in question…”
The proportionality principle can be easily summarized by Lord Diplock‘s aphorism ‗you must not use a steam hammer to crack a nut, if a nutcracker would do?‘ [Refer to R v. Goldsmith, [1983] 1 WLR 151, 155 (Diplock J)]. In other words, proportionality is all about means and ends. The suitability of proportionality analysis under Part III, needs to be observed herein. The nature of fundamental rights has been extensively commented upon. One view is that the fundamental rights apply as ‗rules‘, wherein they apply in an ‗all¬ or ¬nothing fashion‘. This view is furthered by Ronald Dworkin, who argued in his theory that concept of a right implies its ability to trump over a public good. Dworkin‘s view necessarily means that the rights themselves are the end, which cannot be derogated as they represent the highest norm under the Constitution. This would imply that if the legislature or executive act in a particular manner, in derogation of the right, with an object of achieving public good, they shall be prohibited from doing so if the aforesaid action requires restriction of a right. However, while such an approach is often taken by American Courts, the same may not be completely suitable in the Indian context, having regard to the structure of Part III which comes with inbuilt restrictions. Source: Excerpt taken from a judgment delivered by the bench of N. V. Ramanna, R. Subhash Reddy, B.R. Gavai, J.J. on 10th January, 2020.
In taking this view, Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, speaking for a majority of five judges, relied upon the judgment of Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the US Supreme Court in Wolf v Colorado, which held:
“The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police … is basic to a free society… We have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
While the Court observed that the Indian Constitution does not contain a guarantee similar to the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, it proceeded to hold that: 
“Nevertheless, these extracts would show that an unauthorised intrusion into a person‘s home and the disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilisation. An English Common Law maxim asserts that ―every man‘s house is his castle‖ and in Semayne case [5 Coke 91: 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] where this was applied, it was stated that ―the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress as well as for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose‖. We are not unmindful of the fact that Semayne case [(1604) 5 Coke 91: 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] was concerned with the law relating to executions in England, but the passage extracted has a validity quite apart from the context of the particular decision. It embodies an abiding principle which transcends mere protection of property rights and expounds a concept of ―personal liberty‖ which does not rest on any element of feudalism or on any theory of freedom which has ceased to be of value.”
 Source: Excerpt taken from the Judgment delivered by a 9 Judge bench of the Supreme Court in 2017 and authored by Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud. J.
"9. We now come to the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported as Rajeev Kumar Gupta & Others v. Union of India & Others – (2016) 13 SCC 153. In this judgment, the posts in Prasar Bharati were classified into four Groups–A to D. The precise question that arose before the Court is set out in para 5 thereof in which it is stated that the statutory benefit of 3 per cent reservation in favour of those who are disabled is denied insofar as identified posts in Groups A and B are concerned, since these posts are to be filled through direct recruitment. After noticing the arguments based on the nine-Judge bench in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, this Court held:
14. We now examine the applicability of the prohibition on reservation in promotions as propounded by Indra Sawhney. Prior to Indra Sawhney, reservation in promotions were permitted under law as interpreted by this Court in Southern Railway v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36. Indra Sawhney specifically overruled Rangachari to the extent that reservations in promotions were held in Rangachari to be permitted under Article 16(4) of the Constitution. Indra Sawhney specifically addressed the question whether reservations could be permitted in matters of promotion under Article 16(4). The majority held that reservations in promotion are not permitted under our constitutional scheme. 
15. The respondent argued that the answer to Question 7 in Indra Sawhney squarely covers the situation on hand and the reasons outlined by the majority opinion in Indra Sawhney at… must also apply to bar reservation in promotions to identified posts of Group A and Group B. 
16. We do not agree with the respondent‟s submission. Indra Sawhney ruling arose in the context of reservations in favour of backward classes of citizens falling within the sweep of Article 16(4). 
21. The principle laid down in Indra Sawhney is applicable only when the State seeks to give preferential treatment in the matter of employment under the State to certain classes of citizens identified to be a backward class. Article 16(4) does not disable the State from providing differential treatment (reservations) to other classes of citizens under Article 16(1) if they otherwise deserve such treatment. However, for creating such preferential treatment under law, consistent with the mandate of Article 16(1), the State cannot choose any one of the factors such as caste, religion, etc. mentioned in Article 16(1) as the basis. The basis for providing reservation for PWD is physical disability and not any of the criteria forbidden under Article 16(1). Therefore, the rule of no reservation in promotions as laid down in Indra Sawhney has clearly and normatively no application to PWD."
Source: Excerpt taken from a Judgment of three judge bench comprising of R.F. Nariman, Aniruddha Bose & V. Ramasubramaniyam., JJ.