Question

The name of which of the following judgments has been replaced by '[1]‘ in the passageabove?

• A. Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khalique Laskar
• B. Shamim Ara v. State of UP and Another
• C. Fuzlunbi v. K Khader Vali and Another
• D. Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum
• A. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937
• B. Special Marriage Act of 1872
• C. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986
• D. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019
• A. 1& 2 are correct
• B. 1, 2 & 3 are correct
• C. 1, 2 & 4 are correct
• D. All are correct
• A. Only 1
• B. 1 and 2
• C. 3 and 4
• D. 1, 2 and 3
• A. State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali
• B. Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum
• C. Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
• D. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India
• A. Issues of law which have not been decided or untouched by dictum or decision.
• B. Issues of law which have been settled by court
• C. Issues of law where so many inconsistent decisions are present
• D. Issues of law which should be resolved by the legislature and not by the court
• A. Harvinder Kaur v Harmender Singh Chaudhry
• B. Maneka Gandhi v. Indira Nehru Gandhi
• C. T. Saritha v. Union of India
• D. Prakash v. Phulwati
• A. Only 1
• B. 1 and 2 only
• C. 2, 3 and 4.
• D. 1 and 3 only
• A. Khula is the right of a woman in Islam to divorce and it means separation from her husband
• B. Khula is the right of a man in Islam to divorce and it means separation from his wife
• C. Khula is 'obtaining release from each other‘.
• D. Khula is a form of Talaq practiced in Shia community
• A. Muslim women cannot get divorce on the grounds of cruelty
• B. Hindu woman can get divorce on the conversion to any religion by her husband.Conversion by itself shall not dissolve marriage of Muslim woman but she can obtaindivorce on other grounds after conversion such as cruelty, impotency, disappearance etc.
• C. Hindu woman can get divorce on the non -payment of maintenance for two years
• D. All the above

Answer 1

The Correct Option is B

The correct Option is (B):Shamim Ara v. State of UP and Another

Answer 2

The passage says that "this Court in [1] has held, though not in so many words, that triple talaq lacks legal sanctity," and the question asks which judgment fills that gap, so each option needs to be checked against what it actually decided on triple talaq.

1. Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khalique Laskar: A Gauhati High Court decision on the requirement of reasonable cause and attempts at reconciliation before talaq, influential in shaping later thinking but not itself a Supreme Court holding on the legal sanctity of triple talaq.
2. Shamim Ara v. State of UP and Another: In this 2002 Supreme Court decision the Court held that a mere plea of having pronounced talaq in earlier proceedings, without proof of pronouncement or communication to the wife and without any attempt at reconciliation, does not amount to a valid talaq, and this reasoning is what later opinions describe as having effectively found, without saying so directly, that instant triple talaq lacks legal sanctity.
3. Fuzlunbi v. K Khader Vali and Another: A Supreme Court decision dealing with maintenance for a divorced Muslim woman following talaq, concerned with maintenance rights rather than with pronouncing on the validity of triple talaq itself.
4. Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum: The well known 1985 maintenance case under Section 125 CrPC, which triggered the enactment of the 1986 Act referenced elsewhere in the passage, but it did not decide the legal sanctity of triple talaq.

Of the four, only Shamim Ara directly addresses and undercuts the validity of the kind of unilateral, unexplained talaq at issue, which is why it is treated as the earlier authority the passage says had "not in so many words" already reached this conclusion.

Therefore, the correct answer is Shamim Ara v. State of UP and Another.

Answer 3

The correct Option is (A):The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937

Answer 4

The passage quotes a statutory provision titled "Application of Personal law to Muslims" listing matters such as intestate succession, marriage, talaq, and dower governed by Muslim Personal Law, and the question asks which legislation this text is drawn from.

1. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937: This Act was enacted precisely to ensure Muslims in India are governed by Muslim Personal Law rather than custom in matters like succession, marriage, divorce, dower and guardianship, and its Section 2 uses this same list of subjects, matching the quoted text almost verbatim.
2. Special Marriage Act of 1872: This early Act allowed civil marriages outside personal law systems for those who did not wish to be governed by religious personal law, which is the opposite purpose of the quoted provision that applies Muslim Personal Law rather than displacing it.
3. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986: This Act deals specifically with the maintenance rights of Muslim women after divorce following the Shah Bano controversy, a narrower subject than the broad list of succession, marriage and property matters in the quoted text.
4. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019: This later Act criminalises instant triple talaq specifically and does not contain a general provision applying Muslim Personal Law across succession, property and marriage matters.

The quoted Section 2 language on applying Muslim Personal Law across intestate succession, marriage, dissolution of marriage, dower and guardianship is the defining provision of the 1937 Shariat Application Act and is not found in the other three statutes.

Therefore, the correct answer is The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937.

Answer 5

The correct Option is (B):1, 2 & 3 are correct

Answer 6

Each of the four statements about the Shayara Bano bench needs to be checked individually against what the five judge Constitution Bench actually held and how the votes broke down.

1. Statement 1, Khehar and Nazeer found the practice abhorrent but held the Court lacked power to strike it down: This matches the dissenting opinion of CJI Khehar, joined by Justice Abdul Nazeer, who accepted that triple talaq was undesirable but held that as part of personal law it was not open to judicial invalidation and instead called for a legislative and interim remedy, so this statement is accurate.
2. Statement 2, the bench split 3-2 with the dissent proposing a six month injunction and prodding the legislature: The bench did split 3-2, and the two dissenting judges did propose restraining the practice for six months while Parliament was urged to legislate, so this statement is also accurate.
3. Statement 3, the majority struck it down with two judges calling it arbitrary and the third calling it unislamic: Justices Nariman and Lalit held triple talaq unconstitutional as manifestly arbitrary, while Justice Kurian Joseph reached the same result on the separate ground that the practice is not sanctioned by the Quran itself, so the description of two judges on arbitrariness and a third on religious grounds is accurate.
4. Statement 4, the majority verdict was given by Nariman, Lalit and Chandrachud: The third judge in the majority was Justice Kurian Joseph, not Justice D. Y. Chandrachud, who was not even on this Constitution Bench, so this statement misstates the composition of the majority and is incorrect.

Statements 1 through 3 correctly describe the dissent's reasoning, the 3-2 split with its proposed interim relief, and the majority's two distinct grounds for striking down the practice, while statement 4 substitutes the wrong name for the third majority judge.

Therefore, the correct answer is 1, 2 & 3 are correct.

Answer 7

The correct Option is (A):Only 1

Answer 8

Each numbered statement describes a form of talaq, and the question asks which one is incorrectly matched to its definition, so the accepted classical description of each form needs to be compared with what the statement says.

1. Only 1: Talaq Ahsan is classically described as a single pronouncement of divorce made during a tuhr, the period between menstruations, followed by abstinence from sexual intercourse through the period of iddat, and if not revoked during that time it becomes irrevocable; the statement instead describes three pronouncements during a tuhr, which is not the Ahsan form at all, making this the incorrectly matched item.
2. 1 and 2: This would only be right if the description of Talaq Hasan in statement 2 were also wrong, but that statement correctly describes Hasan as three pronouncements made across three successive tuhrs with no intercourse in between, matching the accepted definition.
3. 3 and 4: These describe the two recognised varieties of Talaq-ul-Biddat, either three pronouncements in one sitting or a single but clearly irrevocable pronouncement, and both descriptions match the accepted classical account of that form.
4. 1, 2 and 3: This would require both the Hasan and the first Biddat description to also be wrong, but neither is, so only statement 1 is actually mismatched.

Statement 1 mislabels the single-pronouncement Ahsan form as a triple pronouncement, while statements 2, 3 and 4 correctly track the accepted classical definitions of Hasan and the two Biddat variants.

Therefore, the correct answer is Only 1.

Answer 9

The correct Option is (A):State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali

Answer 10

The question asks which case held that personal laws fall outside the Fundamental Rights chapter and so cannot be struck down by the courts, and each listed case needs to be checked against what it actually decided on that point.

1. State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali: The Bombay High Court in this case held that personal laws are not "laws in force" within the meaning of Article 13 and therefore cannot be tested against, or struck down for inconsistency with, fundamental rights, a proposition that has been repeatedly cited and relied upon in later personal law litigation.
2. Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum: This case concerned a Muslim woman's right to maintenance under the general, religion-neutral Section 125 CrPC, and did not lay down any proposition insulating personal law from fundamental rights scrutiny.
3. Daniel Latifi v. Union of India: This case upheld the validity of the 1986 Act on maintenance for divorced Muslim women by interpreting it consistently with Article 21, which is the opposite exercise of applying constitutional rights to personal-law-adjacent legislation rather than declaring personal law beyond their reach.
4. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India: This case dealt with the validity of a Hindu husband's conversion to Islam solely to contract a second marriage and held such a marriage bigamous, a question about circumventing the law rather than about whether personal law is immune from fundamental rights review.

Only the Narasu Appa Mali case actually establishes the specific proposition that personal laws sit outside Article 13 and are therefore immune from being struck down as violative of fundamental rights.

Therefore, the correct answer is State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali.

Answer 11

The correct Option is (A):Issues of law which have not been decided or untouched by dictum or decision.

Answer 12

The passage uses the Latin phrase "no more res integra" to describe the status of the triple talaq question after the earlier judgment, and the meaning of the phrase needs to be tested against each option.

1. Issues of law which have not been decided or untouched by dictum or decision: "Res integra" literally means an untouched or whole matter, used in legal writing for a question that has not yet been settled by any binding decision, and saying an issue is "no more res integra" means it has now been decided and is no longer an open question, which fits exactly how the passage uses the phrase.
2. Issues of law which have been settled by court: This describes the opposite state, a matter that already has a binding precedent, which is what "res integra" stops being once a decision is rendered, not what the phrase itself means.
3. Issues of law where so many inconsistent decisions are present: Res integra is not about a conflict among multiple rulings but about the total absence of any ruling at all, so this describes a different situation.
4. Issues of law which should be resolved by the legislature and not by the court: This is a separation-of-powers point unrelated to the meaning of res integra, which is purely a statement about whether a question has previously been judicially decided.

Because the passage says the triple talaq question is "no more" res integra, meaning it has already been settled by the earlier decision, the phrase itself must refer to a matter left untouched by any prior ruling.

Therefore, the correct answer is Issues of law which have not been decided or untouched by dictum or decision.

Answer 13

The correct Option is (A):Harvinder Kaur v Harmender Singh Chaudhry

Answer 14

The quoted passage compares introducing constitutional law into the home to introducing a bull into a china shop and says Articles 21 and 14 have no place there, and each option needs to be checked against which case actually contains this reasoning.

1. Harvinder Kaur v Harmender Singh Chaudhry: In this Delhi High Court decision on restitution of conjugal rights, the Court rejected the argument that Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy and dignity under Article 21, using this vivid metaphor to explain why constitutional scrutiny should not intrude into the private sphere of marriage, which matches the quoted language exactly.
2. Maneka Gandhi v. Indira Nehru Gandhi: Despite the similar-sounding petitioner name, this is unrelated to the landmark Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India personal liberty case and has no connection to restitution of conjugal rights or this particular passage.
3. T. Saritha v. Union of India: This Andhra Pradesh High Court decision took the opposite position, holding Section 9 unconstitutional as an intrusion on personal liberty, which is the reasoning this quoted passage was written to reject, not the source of the quote itself.
4. Prakash v. Phulwati: A Supreme Court decision on a daughter's coparcenary rights under the Hindu Succession Act, an entirely different subject with no connection to restitution of conjugal rights or this quotation.

The bull-in-a-china-shop metaphor and the specific reasoning that Articles 21 and 14 have no place inside a marriage are drawn from the Delhi High Court's judgment upholding restitution of conjugal rights against a constitutional challenge.

Therefore, the correct answer is Harvinder Kaur v Harmender Singh Chaudhry.

Answer 15

The correct Option is (D):1 and 3 only

Answer 16

Four statements about the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are given, and each needs to be checked individually against what the Act and related succession law actually provide.

1. Statement 1, HMA 1955 recognizes Personal Law of Hindus: The Hindu Marriage Act is itself the codification of Hindu personal law on marriage, so it does recognise and give statutory form to Hindu personal law rather than displacing it, making this statement accurate.
2. Statement 2, HMA does not recognize Personal Laws and is a landmark legislation toward a Uniform Civil Code: This directly contradicts statement 1, since the Act is a codification of Hindu personal law rather than a religion-neutral, uniform code like the Special Marriage Act, so this statement is inaccurate.
3. Statement 3, two Hindus registering under the Special Marriage Act remain governed by the Hindu Succession Act rather than the Indian Succession Act: Section 21A of the Special Marriage Act specifically preserves the applicability of the Hindu Succession Act to succession where both parties to a Special Marriage Act marriage are Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, so this statement correctly describes the law.
4. Statement 4, HMA 1955 recognized widow remarriage for the first time in India: Widow remarriage was already legally recognised nearly a century earlier through the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856, so crediting the 1955 Act with being the first to do so is factually incorrect.

Statements 1 and 3 hold up against the text of the Act and the Special Marriage Act's succession provision, while statement 2 contradicts statement 1 and statement 4 ignores the 1856 Act that preceded it by a century.

Therefore, the correct answer is 1 and 3 only.

Answer 17

The correct Option is (A):Khula is the right of a woman in Islam to divorce and it means separation from her husband

Answer 18

The question asks what "Khula" means as used in the passage among the list of terms like talaq, ila, zihar, lian and mubaraat, and each option needs to be tested against the accepted meaning of the term in Muslim personal law.

1. Khula is the right of a woman in Islam to divorce and it means separation from her husband: Khula is recognised in Muslim personal law as a mode of dissolving marriage initiated by the wife, typically by offering to return her dower or give some other consideration to the husband in exchange for release from the marriage, so describing it as the wife's route to separation captures both who exercises the right and what it achieves.
2. Khula is the right of a man in Islam to divorce and it means separation from his wife: This reverses the roles; a husband's unilateral right to end the marriage is talaq, not khula, and khula is specifically the avenue available to the wife.
3. Khula is 'obtaining release from each other': This phrase captures only the mutual-release flavour of the arrangement but drops the essential point that it is the wife who initiates and seeks the release, which is the defining feature that distinguishes khula from other forms of separation listed alongside it in the passage.
4. Khula is a form of Talaq practiced in Shia community: Khula is not a variant of talaq at all, and it is not confined to the Shia community; it is a wife-initiated mode of divorce recognised generally across classical Muslim personal law.

Among the options, the one that correctly identifies both who holds the right and what it achieves, namely the wife's right to secure separation from her husband, is the accurate description of khula.

Therefore, the correct answer is Khula is the right of a woman in Islam to divorce and it means separation from her husband.

Answer 19

The correct Option is (B):Muslim women cannot get divorce on the grounds of cruelty

Answer 20

This question tests the statutory grounds of divorce available to a wife under two separate personal law statutes, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. Each option needs to be checked against what these laws actually say.

1. Option (A): This claims a Muslim woman cannot seek divorce on the ground of cruelty. That is incorrect. Section 2(viii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 expressly lists cruelty by the husband, including physical ill-treatment, unequal treatment among co-wives, or association with women of ill repute, as a valid ground on which a Muslim wife may obtain a decree of divorce.
2. Option (B): This is accurate on two counts. Under Section 13(1)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a Hindu wife (or husband) can seek divorce simply because the other spouse has converted to another religion, ceasing to be Hindu; no further proof of ill-treatment is needed. For a Muslim wife, conversion of the husband does not by itself dissolve the marriage, but she remains free to petition for divorce on independent grounds such as cruelty, impotency, or the husband's disappearance for a stated period. Both limbs of this statement match the law correctly.
3. Option (C): This attributes non-payment of maintenance for two years as a ground of divorce for a Hindu wife. That ground actually belongs to Muslim personal law: Section 2(ii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 allows a Muslim wife to sue for divorce if the husband has neglected or failed to provide maintenance for two years. The Hindu Marriage Act does not contain a corresponding fault ground phrased this way, so this statement misapplies a Muslim-law ground to Hindu law and is not correct.
4. Option (D): Since option (A) misstates the Muslim-law position on cruelty and option (C) misattributes a Muslim-law maintenance ground to Hindu law, they cannot all be correct together, so all of the above fails.

Only option (B) correctly states the divorce position for both a Hindu wife (conversion of the spouse as an independent ground) and a Muslim wife (conversion alone does not dissolve the marriage, but other grounds remain open).

Hence, the correct answer is Option (B): Hindu woman can get divorce on the conversion to any religion by her husband. Conversion by itself shall not dissolve marriage of Muslim woman but she can obtain divorce on other grounds after conversion such as cruelty, impotency, disappearance etc.