Comprehension
The Supreme Court of India noted that it is a prevalent gender stereotype that women officers find it challenging to meet the hazards of service owing to their prolonged absence during pregnancy, motherhood and domestic obligations towards their children and families, as the notion assumes that domestic obligations rest solely on women. Reliance on the ‘inherent physiological differences between men and women’ rests in a deeply entrenched stereotypical and constitutionally flawed notion that women are the ‘weaker’ sex and may not undertake tasks that are ‘too arduous’ for them. Arguments founded on the physical strengths and weaknesses of men and women and on assumptions about women in the social context of marriage and family do not constitute a constitutionally valid basis for denying equal opportunity to women officers. To deny the grant of permanent commission to women officers on the ground that this would upset the ‘peculiar dynamics’ in a unit casts an undue burden on women officers which has been claimed as a ground for excluding women. If society holds strong beliefs about gender roles, that men are socially dominant, physically powerful and the breadwinners of the family and that women are weak and physically submissive, and primarily caretakers confined to a domestic atmosphere, it is unlikely that there would be a change in mindsets
Question: 1
Which of the following judgments relating to equality of opportunity for women seeking Permanent Commissions in the Indian Army is the excerpt taken from?
Which of the following judgments relating to equality of opportunity for women seeking Permanent Commissions in the Indian Army is the excerpt taken from?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 74
- Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 230.
- Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469
- Dipika Jagatram Sahani v. Union of India, (2021) 2 SCC 740.
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The Correct Option is C
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The correct option is (C) : Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469
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This question tests recognition of the specific judgment the excerpt is drawn from, which can be approached by matching each case's known subject matter to the content of the passage.
- Option A: Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India concerns the rights of Indian seamen and does not deal with permanent commissions for women officers in the Army, so its subject matter does not fit the excerpt.
- Option B: Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh deals with judicial sensitivity in handling sexual offence cases and gender stereotyping in bail conditions, a different context from grant of permanent commissions in the armed forces.
- Option C: Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya is the landmark decision that directly addressed the denial of permanent commissions to women officers in the Indian Army, examining the same stereotypes about physiological difference and domestic obligations described in the excerpt.
- Option D: Dipika Jagatram Sahani v. Union of India does not concern the Army's permanent commission policy for women officers, so it does not match the subject of the excerpt either.
Matching the excerpt's subject, women officers being denied permanent commissions on the basis of physiological stereotypes, to the case that actually decided that question points to only one judgment.
Hence, the correct answer is Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469.
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Question: 2
Based on the given excerpt from a judgment, which of the following was not a direction given by the Supreme Court of India
Based on the given excerpt from a judgment, which of the following was not a direction given by the Supreme Court of India
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Women officers on Short Service Commission with more than twelve years of service who do not opt for being considered for the grant of the Permanent Commissions will be entitled to continue in service until they complete twenty-two years of pensionable service
- Short Service Commission women officers with over twenty years of service who are not granted Permanent Commission shall retire on pension in terms of the policy decision
- All serving women officers on Short Service Commission shall be considered for the grant of Permanent Commission irrespective of any of them having completed fourteen years or, as the case may be, twenty years of service.
- Short Service Commission women officers who are granted Permanent Commission in pursuance of the above directions will be entitled to all consequential benefits including promotion and financial benefits.
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The Correct Option is A
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The correct option is (A) : Women officers on Short Service Commission with more than twelve years of service who do not opt for being considered for the grant of the Permanent Commissions will be entitled to continue in service until they complete twenty-two years of pensionable service
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This question asks which of four claimed directions was not actually issued in the judgment underlying the excerpt, so each option needs to be checked for internal plausibility against what the real directions covered.
- Option A: This option ties eligibility to "more than twelve years of service" and a cut-off of "twenty-two years of pensionable service." These specific figures do not match the actual thresholds used elsewhere in the directions on this subject, built around fourteen and twenty years of service, which is the clearest sign that this particular framing was not one of the directions actually given.
- Option B: Women officers with over twenty years of service who are not granted permanent commission retiring on pension per the policy decision is consistent with how officers past the higher service threshold were treated, so this reads as an authentic direction.
- Option C: Considering all serving SSC women officers for permanent commission "irrespective of any of them having completed fourteen years or, as the case may be, twenty years of service" reflects the actual thresholds, fourteen and twenty years, that this line of directions is known for, so this is consistent with a genuine direction.
- Option D: Granting consequential benefits including promotion and financial benefits to officers who receive permanent commission is a standard and expected component of such a direction, and fits naturally with the other confirmed directions.
The option built around service and pension thresholds that do not match the figures used consistently elsewhere in the set of directions is the one that was not actually issued.
Hence, the correct answer is Women officers on Short Service Commission with more than twelve years of service who do not opt for being considered for the grant of the Permanent Commissions will be entitled to continue in service until they complete twenty-two years of pensionable service.
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Question: 3
That women officers would upset the dynamics in a unit is a/an________ ground for denying them permanent commission.
That women officers would upset the dynamics in a unit is a/an________ ground for denying them permanent commission.
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Inevitable
- Strong
- Unreasonable
- Valid
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The Correct Option is C
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The correct option is (C) : Unreasonable
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This question asks how the passage characterises the "peculiar dynamics" argument used to deny permanent commissions to women officers.
- Option A: "Inevitable" is not a characterisation the passage applies to this ground; the passage is evaluating the argument's legitimacy, not describing it as unavoidable.
- Option B: Calling the ground "strong" would suggest the passage endorses it, but the passage instead criticises the reasoning as resting on an undue burden placed on women officers.
- Option C: The passage states that denying permanent commission on this basis "casts an undue burden on women officers which has been claimed as a ground for excluding women," framed within a broader critique of arguments resting on stereotypical assumptions that are described as constitutionally flawed. This critical framing marks the ground as unreasonable.
- Option D: "Valid" is the opposite of how the passage treats this argument; the passage explicitly says such arguments "do not constitute a constitutionally valid basis for denying equal opportunity to women officers."
The passage's critical treatment of the "peculiar dynamics" argument, tying it to an undue burden and a constitutionally flawed premise, marks it as unreasonable rather than strong, valid, or inevitable.
Hence, the correct answer is Unreasonable.
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Question: 4
Which of the following judgments is not related to equality of opportunity in matters of public employment as guaranteed by the Constitution of India?
Which of the following judgments is not related to equality of opportunity in matters of public employment as guaranteed by the Constitution of India?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 362.
- Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217.
- M. Nagraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212
- Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 56.
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The Correct Option is D
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The correct option is (D) : Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 56.
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This question asks which of four cited cases falls outside the theme of equality of opportunity in public employment, which can be answered by recalling the actual subject matter of each judgment.
- Option A: Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister dealt with the validity of Maratha reservation in public employment and education, squarely within the theme of equality of opportunity in public employment.
- Option B: Indra Sawhney v. Union of India is the foundational Mandal Commission judgment on reservation in public employment under Article 16, making it a core authority on this very theme.
- Option C: M. Nagraj v. Union of India examined the constitutional validity of reservation in promotions in public services, again directly within the equality of opportunity in public employment framework.
- Option D: Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India concerns a service dispute involving allegations against an intelligence official and matters of personal liberty and dignity, not the constitutional framework for reservation or equality of opportunity in public employment as such.
Three of the four cases are landmark authorities specifically on reservation and equality of opportunity in public employment, while the fourth addresses a different kind of dispute altogether.
Hence, the correct answer is Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 56.
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Question: 5
Based on the given excerpt, which of the following is correct regarding blanket restriction on women officers in Army?
Based on the given excerpt, which of the following is correct regarding blanket restriction on women officers in Army?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Equality should not ensure that where the action of the State does differentiate between two classes of persons, it does not differentiate them in an unreasonable or irrational manner.
- An absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments would not comport with the guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
- Where the Army as an instrumentality of the State, differentiates between women and men, the burden does not fall on the Army to justify such differentiation with reason
- An absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments would comply with the guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
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The Correct Option is B
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The correct option is (B) : An absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments would not comport with the guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
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This question asks which statement correctly captures the Court's position on an absolute bar against women in certain Army appointments, drawing on ordinary equality doctrine as well as the passage's own reasoning.
- Option A: This option is internally garbled, stating that equality "should not ensure" that differentiation avoids being unreasonable or irrational, which inverts the basic requirement of Article 14 that any classification must itself be reasonable; this cannot be the correct statement of the law.
- Option B: The passage's own reasoning, that arguments resting on physical differences and social assumptions about women "do not constitute a constitutionally valid basis for denying equal opportunity to women officers," supports the conclusion that a total, absolute bar on women in these roles would fail the guarantee of equality under Article 14. This matches ordinary equality doctrine as well: an absolute, blanket exclusion is precisely the kind of classification the passage treats as constitutionally flawed.
- Option C: The passage's entire thrust is that the State, including the Army as its instrumentality, does bear the burden of justifying differential treatment with a valid reason; asserting the opposite, that the burden does not fall on the Army, contradicts the passage's reasoning.
- Option D: This is the direct opposite of what the passage supports; since stereotypical assumptions are called constitutionally flawed, an absolute bar built on them cannot comply with Article 14.
Only the option stating that an absolute bar would not comport with the equality guarantee follows naturally from the passage's rejection of stereotype-based justifications for excluding women officers.
Hence, the correct answer is An absolute bar on women seeking criteria or command appointments would not comport with the guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
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Question: 6
“The unrelenting continuation of this immoral practice, the globally shared understanding that it constitutes a form of violence against women, and its potential to damage the very fabric of gender equality and dignity that forms the bedrock of our Constitution are all factors that categorically establish pre-natal sex determination as a grave offence with serious consequences for the society as a whole.” In which of the following cases was the above observation made?
“The unrelenting continuation of this immoral practice, the globally shared understanding that it constitutes a form of violence against women, and its potential to damage the very fabric of gender equality and dignity that forms the bedrock of our Constitution are all factors that categorically establish pre-natal sex determination as a grave offence with serious consequences for the society as a whole.” In which of the following cases was the above observation made?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1.
- S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1023
- Rekha Sengar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 3 SCC 729.
- State of Orissa v. Mamata Sahoo, (2019) 7 SCC 486.
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The Correct Option is C
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The correct option is (C) : Rekha Sengar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 3 SCC 729.
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The passage links pre-natal sex determination to violence against women and to constitutional values of gender equality and dignity, so the case being asked about must be one that specifically deals with the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act and the offence of sex determination. Each option can be tested by asking what area of law that judgment actually deals with.
- Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1: This judgment concerns quashing of multiple FIRs against a television anchor over remarks made on a news debate, and it develops the law on free speech, hate speech and the test for quashing FIRs under Section 482 CrPC. It has nothing to do with sex determination or the PNDT Act, so it cannot be the source of this observation.
- S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1023: This case deals with the interplay between the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act and the Senior Citizens Act, specifically a daughter-in-law's right of residence against eviction proceedings initiated by in-laws. It concerns residence rights, not pre-natal sex determination.
- Rekha Sengar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 3 SCC 729: This is a case arising directly under the PNDT Act, where the accused sought quashing of criminal proceedings for conducting or facilitating sex determination. The Supreme Court refused to quash the case and made strong observations on the continuing prevalence of the practice, its character as violence against women, and its threat to gender equality guaranteed by the Constitution. The language of the passage, invoking dignity, gender equality and the constitutional bedrock, matches the tenor of this judgment precisely.
- State of Orissa v. Mamata Sahoo, (2019) 7 SCC 486: This is a service law matter dealing with regularisation and pensionary benefits of an employee, an area entirely removed from the subject of sex selection or women's dignity in this sense.
Only the third option is a judgment actually concerned with the PNDT Act and pre-natal sex determination, which is the exact subject the quoted passage addresses, so the other three are ruled out purely on subject matter regardless of their citation details.
Therefore, the correct answer is Rekha Sengar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 3 SCC 729.
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Top CLAT PG Questions
- Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)] - An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’] - The other material which prompted the High Court to reach the conclusion that the subsoil/minerals vest in the State is … recitals of a patta which ….. states that if minerals are found in the property covered by the patta and if the pattadar exploits those minerals, the pattadar is liable for a separate tax in addition to the tax shown in the patta and …. certain standing orders of the Collector of Malabar which provided for collection of seigniorage fee in the event of the mining operation being carried on. We are of the clear opinion that the recitals in the patta or the Collector’s standing order that the exploitation of mineral wealth in the patta land would attract additional tax, in our opinion, cannot in any way indicate the ownership of the State in the minerals. The power to tax is a necessary incident of sovereign authority (imperium) but not an incident of proprietary rights (dominium). Proprietary right is a compendium of rights consisting of various constituent, rights. If a person has only a share in the produce of some property, it can never be said that such property vests in such a person. In the instant case, the State asserted its ‘right’ to demand a share in the ‘produce of the minerals worked’ though the expression employed is right – it is in fact the Sovereign authority which is asserted. From the language of the BSO No.10 it is clear that such right to demand the share could be exercised only when the pattadar or somebody claiming through the pattadar, extracts/works the minerals – the authority of the State to collect money on the happening of an event – such a demand is more in the nature of an excise duty/a tax. The assertion of authority to collect a duty or tax is in the realm of the sovereign authority, but not a proprietary right….
The only other submission which we are required to deal with before we part with this matter is the argument of the learned counsel for the State that in view of the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereafter ‘MMDRA’) which prohibits under Section 4 the carrying on of any mining activity in this country except in accordance with the permit, licence or mining lease as the case may be, granted under the Act, the appellants cannot claim any proprietary right in the sub-soil…
[Extract from the judgment in Thressiamma Jacob v. Dept. of Mining & Geology, (2013) 9 SCC 725] (hereafter ‘T Jacob’) - A nationwide lockdown was declared by the Central Government from 24 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity came to a grinding halt. The lockdown was extended on several occasions, among them for the second time on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the Labour and Employment Department of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 5 of the Factories Act to exempt all factories registered under the Act “from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers” under Sections 51, 54, 55 and 56. The stated aim of the notification was to provide “certain relaxations for industrial and commercial activities” from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020.
Section 5 of the Factories Act provides that in a public emergency, the State Government can exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of the Act, except Section 67. Section 5 is extracted below: “5. Power to exempt during public emergency. — In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act except section 67 for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: Provided that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section ‘public emergency’ means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance.” (emphasis supplied) The notification in its relevant part is extracted below:
“... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the ‘Factories Act’ PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, –
(1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week.
(2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour.
(3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM.
(4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees).”
[Extract from judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. The State of Gujarat decided on 1 October, 2020, (hereafter ‘GMS’)] - In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter ‘Lalita Kumari’)]
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