SEBI was established as India’s principal capital markets regulator with the aim to pro tect the interest of investors in securities and promote the development and regulation of the securities market in India. SEBI is empowered to regulate the securities market in India by the SEBI Act 1992, the SCRA and the Depositories Act 1996. SEBI’s powers to regulate the securities market are wide and include delegated legislative, administrative, and adjudicatory powers to enforce SEBI’s regulations. SEBI exercises its delegated legislative power by inter alia framing regulations and appropriately amending them to keep up with the dynamic nature of the securities’ market. SEBI has issued a number of regulations on various areas of security regulation which form the backbone of the framework governing the securities market in India. Section 11 of the SEBI Act lays down the functions of SEBI and expressly states that it ”shall be the duty of the Board to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate the securities market, by such measures as it thinks fit”. Fur ther, Section 30 of the SEBI Act empowers SEBI to make regulations consistent with the Act. Significantly, while framing these regulations, SEBI consults its advisory committees consisting of domain experts, including market experts, leading market players, legal experts, technol ogy experts, retired Judges of this Court or the High Courts, academicians, representatives of industry associations and investor associations. During the consultative process, SEBI also in vites and duly considers comments from the public on their proposed regulations. SEBI follows similar consultative processes while reviewing and amending its regulations.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from the judgement in Vishal Tiwari v. Union Of India, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 171)

“The power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and we have no doubt, in our mind, that it should be so treated also in the Indian Republic. It has been reposed by the people through the Constitution in the Head of the State, and enjoys high status. It is a constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context. It is not denied, and indeed it has been repeatedly affirmed in the course of argument by learned counsels appearing for the Petitioner that the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of Article 74(1) of the Constitution, must act in accordance with such advice......”
We are of the view that it is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by Article 72 of the Constitution to scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on the accused. In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed. The President acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted. He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it. This is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.
It is apparent that the power under Article 72 entitles the President to examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of the relief falling within that power. We are of opinion that the President is entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has been judicially concluded by the consideration given to it by this Court. In Kehar Singh v. Union of India, 1989 SC, this court stated that the same obviously means that the affected party need not be given the reasons. The question whether reasons can or cannot be disclosed to the Court when the same is challenged was not the subject-matter of consideration. In any event, the absence of any obligation to convey the reasons does not mean that there should not be legitimate or relevant reasons for passing the order.
Extract from the judgment of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India 2014 (3) SCC 1

To recall, the petitioners while challenging the 1951 and 1965 amendments to the AMU Act in Azeez Basha argued that the amendments were violative of the right to administration guaran teed by Article 30(1). The Union of India responded to the argument with the submission that the Muslim minority cannot claim the right to administration since it did not ’establish’ the institution. Opposing this argument, the petitioners in Azeez Basha, submitted that Article 30(1) guarantees the ’right to administer’ an educational institution to minorities even if it was not established by them, if by ”some process, it had been administering the same before the Constitution came into force.” The argument of the petitioners was rejected. This Court held that the words ”establish” and ”administer” must be read conjunctively, that is, the guarantee of the right to administration is contingent on the establishment of the institution by religious or linguistic minorities...
The issue before this Bench is the indicia for an educational institution to be a minority educa tional institution. Should it be proved that the institution was established by the minority, or it was administered by the minority, or both? The petitioners and the respondents agree that the words ’establish’ and ’administer’ must be read conjunctively. They argue that administration is a sequitur to establishment. However, they disagree on the test to be applied to identify a minority education institution. The petitioners argue that the only indicia for a minority ed ucational institution is that it must be established by a minority, while the respondents argue that the dual test of establishment and administration must be satisfied.
(Extracted with edits and revisions from Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors, 2024 SC 8)

Ahmadi, J. (as he then was) speaking for himself and Punchhi, J., endorsed the recommendations in the following words-The time is ripe for taking stock of the working of the various Tribunals set up in the country after the insertion of Articles 323-A and 323-B in the Constitution. After the incorporation of these two articles, Acts have been enacted where-under tribunals have been constituted for dispensation of justice. Sufficient time has passed, and experience gained in these last few years for taking stock of the situation with a view to finding out if they have served the purpose and objectives for which they were constituted. Complaints have been heard in regard to the functioning of other tribunals as well and it is time that a body like the Law Commission of India has a comprehensive look-in with a view to suggesting measures for their improved functioning. That body can also suggest changes in the different statutes and evolve a model on the basis whereof tribunals may be constituted or reconstituted with a view to ensuring greater independence. An intensive and extensive study needs to be undertaken by the Law Commission in regard to the Constitution of tribunals under various statutes with a view to ensuring their independence so that the public confidence in such tribunals may increase and the quality of their performance may improve.
Before parting with the case, it is necessary to express our anguish over the ineffectiveness of the alternative mechanism devised for judicial review. The judicial review and remedy are the fundamental rights of the citizens. The dispensation of justice by the tribunal is much to be desired.
(Extracted with Edits from R.K. Jain v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 119)

Article 14 of the Constitution stipulates that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. Article 15(1) states that the State should not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(4) stipulates that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Clause (1) of Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Clause (2) stipulates that no citizen shall be discriminated in or be ineligible for any employment or office under the State on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Clause (4) of the provision states that nothing in Article 16 shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. The purpose of the equal opportunity principle in Article 16(1) and the reservation provision in Article 16(4) has emerged as a focal point of the jurisprudence on reservations in this Court. A discussion of the journey of the competing models of equality that the Court has espoused and their evolution over the course of the years is necessary to understand the constitutional vision on equality.
The impugned constitutional amendments by which Article 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) have been inserted, flow from Article 16 (4). They do not alter the structure of Article 16 (4). They retain the controlling factors or the compelling reasons which enables the State to provide for reservation keeping in mind the overall efficiency of the state administration under article 335. Sub-categorization within a class is a constitutional requirement to secure substantive equality in the event that there is a distinction between two sections of a class; Sub-classification must not lead to the exclusion of one of the categories in the class. A model that provides sufficient opportunities to all categories of the class must be adopted; and Sub-classification among a class must be on a reasonable basis.
Justice Bela Trivedi opined, in dissent, that presidential list of scheduled castes notified under Article 341 cannot be altered by the States. Any change to this list can only be made by a law enacted by Parliament. Sub-classification, according to her would amount to tampering with the Presidential List and undermine the object Article 341, which aims to eliminate political influence in the SC-ST List. Further, she emphasised the importance of adhering to the rule of plain and literal interpretation. She mentions that any preferential treatment for a sub-class within the presidential list would deprive other classes within the same category of their benefits. In the absence of executive or legislative power, state lack the competence to sub-classify castes and the benefit reserved for all SCs. Allowing states to do so would constitute a colourable exercise of power, which is impermissible under law. Justice Trivedi concluded by affirming that affirmative action by States must remain within constitutional boundaries and held that the law laid down in E.V. Chinnaiah case was correct and should be upheld.
(Extract from The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 2024 SC)

Article 21 of the Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law. Conversely, we think that a person is entitled to the protection of his liberty only in accordance with law. When a person’s liberty cannot be violated in breach of a law, can a person’s liberty be protected even in the face of a breach or violation of law? In other words, should rule of law prevail over personal liberty of a person or vice-versa? Further, should this Court weigh in favour of a person’s freedom and liberty even when it has been established that the same was granted in violation of law? Should the scales of justice tilt against rule of law? We wish to make it clear that only when rule of law prevails will liberty and all other fundamental rights would prevail under our Constitution including the right to equality and equal protection of law as enshrined in Article 14 thereof. Justice Nagarathna, who authored the judgement, began her pronouncement by invoking classical Greek Philosopher Plato. “Punishment is to be inflicted not for the sake of vengeance but for the sake of prevention and reformation. In his treatise, Plato reasons that the lawgiver, as far as he can, ought to imitate the doctor who does not apply his drug with a view to pain only, but to do the patient good. This curative theory of punishment likens penalty to medicine administered for the sake of the one being
chastised. Thus, if a criminal is curable, he ought to be improved by education and other suitable arts and the set free as a better citizen and less of a burden to the state. This postulate lies at the heart of the policy of remission.” Having said that, she also pointed out the competing interests involved, of the rights of the victim’s family to justice and the right of the convicts to a second chance by remission or reduction of their sentence. She added, “A woman deserves respect howsoever high or low she may otherwise be considered in the society or whatever faith she may follow or whatever creed she may belong to. Can heinous crime against women permit remission of the convicts by a reduction in their sentence and
by granting them liberty?”
(This extract has been taken from Bilkis Yakoob Rasul v. Union of India (2024) 5 SCC 481)

“The power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and we have no doubt, in our mind, that it should be so treated also in the Indian Republic. It has been reposed by the people through the Constitution in the Head of the State, and enjoys high status. It is a constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context. It is not denied, and indeed it has been repeatedly affirmed in the course of argument by learned counsels appearing for the Petitioner that the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of Art. 74(1) of the Constitution, must act in accordance with such advice......”
We are of the view that it is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by Art. 72 of the Constitution to scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on the accused. In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed. The President acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted. He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it. This is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.
It is apparent that the power under Art. 72 entitles the President to examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of the relief falling within that power. We are of opinion that the President is
entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has been judicially concluded by the consideration given to it by this Court. In Kehar Singh v. Union of India, 1989 SC, this court stated that the same obviously means that the affected party need not be given the reasons. The question whether reasons can or cannot be disclosed to the Court when the same is challenged was not the subject-matter of consideration. In any event, the absence of any obligation to convey the reasons does not mean that there should not be legitimate
or relevant reasons for passing the order.
[Extract from the judgment of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India 2014 (3) SCC 1]

The principles of democracy and federalism are essential features of our Constitution and form a part of the basic structure. Federalism in a multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic country like India ensures the representation of diverse interests. It is a means to reconcile the desire of commonality along with the desire for autonomy and accommodate diverse needs in a pluralistic society. Recognizing regional aspirations strengthens the unity of the country and embodies the spirit of democracy. Thus, in any federal Constitution, at a minimum, there is a dual polity, that is, two sets of government operate: one at the level of the national government and the second at the level of the regional federal units. These dual sets of government, elected by “We the People” in two separate electoral processes, is a dual manifestation of the public will. The priorities of these two sets of governments, which manifest in a federal system are not just bound to be different, but are intended to be different.
While NCTD is not a full-fledged state, its Legislative Assembly is constitutionally entrusted with the power to legislate upon the subjects in the State List and Concurrent List. It is not a State under the First Schedule to the Constitution, yet it is conferred with power to legislate upon subjects in Lists II and III to give effect to the aspirations of the people of NCTD. It has a democratically elected government which is accountable to the people of NCTD. Under the constitutional scheme envisaged in Article 239AA (3), NCTD was given legislative power which though limited, in many aspects is similar to States. In that sense, with addition of Article 239AA, the Constitution created a federal model with the Union of India at the centre, and the NCTD at the regional level. This is the asymmetric federal model adopted for NCTD. While NCTD remains a Union Territory, the unique constitutional status conferred upon it makes it a federal entity for the purpose of understanding the relationship between the Union and NCTD.
While NCTD is not a full-fledged state, its Legislative Assembly is constitutionally entrusted with the power to legislate upon the subjects in the State List and Concurrent List. It is not a State under the First Schedule to the Constitution, yet it is conferred with power to legislate upon subjects in Lists II and III to give effect to the aspirations of the people of NCTD. It has a democratically elected government which is accountable to the people of NCTD. Under the constitutional scheme envisaged in Article 239AA (3), NCTD was given legislative power which though limited, in many aspects is similar to States. In that sense, with addition of Article 239AA, the Constitution created a federal model with the Union of India at the centre, and the NCTD at the regional level. This is the asymmetric federal model adopted for NCTD. While NCTD remains a Union Territory, the unique constitutional status conferred upon it makes it a federal entity for the purpose of understanding the relationship between the Union and NCTD.
[Extracted from Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, 2023 SCC Online SC 606 (hereafter GNCTD Case)]

The concept of per se disqualification is unknown to the Constitution. Any decision as to the disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule must be taken after following the due process of law and the principles of natural justice. A member incurs disqualification only after adjudication by the Speaker. The procedure for the adjudication of disqualification petitions is prescribed under the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules 1986. The MLAs facing disqualification retain the right to participate in the proceedings of the House and vote on resolutions. Article 189(2) of the Constitution provides that any proceedings of the House are not invalid even if it is subsequently discovered that persons who were not entitled to participate or vote or otherwise take part in the proceedings, did so. In Pratap Gouda Patil v. State of Karnataka and Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha v. Kuldeep Bishnoi, this Court observed that members should not be stopped from taking part in the proceedings of the House merely because disqualification proceedings were pending against them
Prior to the deletion of Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker’s enquiry as to the existence of a split within a political party was limited to a prima facie determination for deciding the disqualification proceedings. As a result of the deletion of Paragraph 3, the authority of the Speaker to form even a prima facie opinion regarding a split within a political party has been removed. Upon the deletion of Paragraph 3, the only defence for disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule are that of a merge under Paragraph 4. The Election Commission of India is the sole authority empowered to decide disputes between rival factions of a political party according to the provisions of the Symbols Order.
[Extracted from Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023)]

Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity.

Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner.

But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.

[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1]

Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)]