Comprehension
The Supreme Court judgment in B. Singh v. Union of India, [(2004) 3 SCC 363] held, when there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, the said petition is to be thrown out. Public interest litigation (PIL) which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be ‘publicity interest litigation’ or ‘private interest litigation’ or ‘politics interest litigation’ or the latest trend ‘paise income litigation’. If not properly regulated and abuse averted, it may become a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreak vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of a knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. The expression ‘PIL’ means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking
Question: 1
Which of the following is not correct in relation to a Public Interest Litigation?
Which of the following is not correct in relation to a Public Interest Litigation?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- It contemplates legal proceedings for vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights of a group of persons or community which are not able to enforce their fundamental rights on account of their incapacity, poverty or ignorance of law.
- A person invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 must approach the court for the vindication of the fundamental rights of affected persons
- Recourse to a proceeding under Article 32 may or may not be taken by a genuinely interested person in protection of society on behalf of community
- Personal interest, grudge or enmity cannot be enforced through the process of the court, preventing speedy remedy to the other genuine petitioners from the court.
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The Correct Option is C
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The correct option is (C) : Recourse to a proceeding under Article 32 may or may not be taken by a genuinely interested person in protection of society on behalf of community.
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This question asks which statement about Public Interest Litigation does NOT correctly describe the doctrine, so each statement needs to be checked on its own against settled PIL principles rather than against each other.
- Option A: This is an accurate description of PIL's core justification, it exists precisely so that fundamental rights of groups who cannot approach the court themselves, whether from poverty, incapacity or ignorance of law, can still be vindicated through a public-spirited petitioner or organisation acting on their behalf.
- Option B: This is also accurate. Whether a petitioner invokes Article 32 for their own rights or on behalf of others, the invocation must still be for the vindication of the fundamental rights of the affected persons, that anchoring requirement is what keeps a PIL a genuine public interest matter rather than a private grievance dressed up as one.
- Option C: This is the one that misstates the position. Settled law does not leave it an open, uncertain question whether a genuinely interested person may take recourse to Article 32 on behalf of the community, it affirmatively permits such recourse. Framing it as something that "may or may not" happen understates a right the courts have consistently recognised and exercised, making this statement inaccurate.
- Option D: This too is an accurate and frequently reiterated caution, personal grudges or private enmity dressed up as public interest cannot be enforced through the court process, and doing so only delays relief for petitioners with genuine causes.
Since A, B, and D each correctly state settled PIL principles, the statement that fails to do so, by wrongly casting a recognised right as merely optional, is the one about recourse under Article 32.
Therefore, the correct answer is Recourse to a proceeding under Article 32 may or may not be taken by a genuinely interested person in protection of society on behalf of community.
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Question: 2
In which of the following judgments, the public trust doctrine was discussed by the Supreme Court of India?
In which of the following judgments, the public trust doctrine was discussed by the Supreme Court of India?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Charu Khurana v. Union of India, (2015) 1 SCC 192.
- Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241.
- Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 388
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The Correct Option is D
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The correct option is (D) : M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 388
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The public trust doctrine holds that certain natural resources are held by the State as a trustee for the benefit of the public and cannot be diverted to purely private, commercial use. The question is which of the four M.C. Mehta line judgments is the one where the Supreme Court actually imported and applied this doctrine into Indian law.
- Charu Khurana v. Union of India: This case concerns gender discrimination in the film industry's make-up artists' association and Article 15, it has no bearing on natural resources or trusteeship principles.
- Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan: This landmark judgment laid down guidelines against sexual harassment at the workplace in the absence of legislation, an entirely different area of law from environmental trusteeship.
- Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal: This case is chiefly remembered for laying down standards to prevent misuse of the PIL jurisdiction itself, it does not deal with the public trust doctrine.
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 388: This is the judgment, arising from the lease of forest land around a riverbank for a private motel, where the Supreme Court held that natural resources such as rivers, forests and lakes are held in trust by the State for the public and cannot be handed over to private commercial interests, formally embedding the public trust doctrine into Indian environmental jurisprudence.
Only the fourth case actually addresses the State's trusteeship over natural resources, which is the essence of the public trust doctrine.
Therefore, the correct answer is M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 388.
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Question: 3
Which of the following issues of public interest is raised in Dipika Jagatram Sahani v. Union of India, [(2021) 2 SCC 740]?
Which of the following issues of public interest is raised in Dipika Jagatram Sahani v. Union of India, [(2021) 2 SCC 740]?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Challenge to election symbol of a political party.
- Reopening and providing services of Anganwadi Centres in India.
- Working conditions of children in factories.
- Pollution caused by industries
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The Correct Option is B
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The correct option is (B) : Reopening and providing services of Anganwadi Centres in India.
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The question asks which public interest issue was actually raised in Dipika Jagatram Sahani v. Union of India, [(2021) 2 SCC 740]. Since the citation itself names the case, the task is to match the subject matter correctly to the four possible issue-areas offered.
- Challenge to election symbol of a political party: Election symbol disputes fall within the Election Commission's and, on challenge, the Supreme Court's election law jurisdiction, an entirely different subject from the welfare petition this case involved.
- Reopening and providing services of Anganwadi Centres in India: This matches the case, which was a public interest matter concerned with the closure of Anganwadi centres during the pandemic period and the resulting disruption to nutrition and childcare services they provide, seeking their reopening and continued functioning.
- Working conditions of children in factories: Child labour and factory working conditions are addressed in a different line of PIL cases concerning enforcement of child labour prohibition law, not this petition.
- Pollution caused by industries: Industrial pollution litigation is a distinct environmental law category, again not the subject matter here.
The petition was specifically about restoring Anganwadi services that had been disrupted, which is the welfare issue actually before the Court in this case.
Therefore, the correct answer is Reopening and providing services of Anganwadi Centres in India.
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Question: 4
Which of the following is not correct regarding the locus standi in a Public Interest Litigation?
Which of the following is not correct regarding the locus standi in a Public Interest Litigation?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Only an affected and vulnerable person can approach the court for remedy.
- The principle of dominus litus does not apply to a public interest litigation
- The public interest litigation is strictly not adversarial since the emphasis is on public good.
- A public interest litigation can be filed by any member of the society for larger public interest
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The Correct Option is A
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The correct option is (A) : Only an affected and vulnerable person can approach the court for remedy.
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The question asks which statement about locus standi in Public Interest Litigation is NOT correct, so each statement should be checked against the settled, relaxed standing rules that define PIL.
- Option A: This is the inaccurate statement. The entire innovation of PIL jurisprudence was to move away from requiring only a personally affected and vulnerable person to approach the court, allowing any public-spirited citizen or organisation with sufficient interest, even without personal injury, to move the court on behalf of those who cannot do so themselves.
- Option B: This is correct. The traditional principle of dominus litus, that only the person whose right is directly at stake controls the litigation, does not govern PIL, since PIL exists precisely to let others litigate on behalf of an affected class.
- Option C: This is also correct. Unlike ordinary adversarial litigation between two contesting private parties, a PIL is meant to be cooperative and directed at ascertaining and securing the public good, so it is correctly described as not strictly adversarial.
- Option D: This is correct as well, PIL can be filed by any member of society acting in good faith for a larger public cause, without needing to show personal injury.
Since B, C, and D correctly capture how standing works in PIL, the one statement that wrongly restricts standing only to affected and vulnerable persons is the incorrect one.
Therefore, the correct answer is Only an affected and vulnerable person can approach the court for remedy.
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Question: 5
“If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him. But, if he belongs to an organisation which has special interest in the subject-matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busybody, he cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be considered.” In context of this statement, which of the following judgments stated this regarding the rights of workers in India?
“If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him. But, if he belongs to an organisation which has special interest in the subject-matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busybody, he cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be considered.” In context of this statement, which of the following judgments stated this regarding the rights of workers in India?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Malik Brothers v. Narendra Dadhich, (1999) 6 SCC 552
- Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 504.
- Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568
- Sheela Barse v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 226.
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The Correct Option is C
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The correct option is (C) : Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568
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The quoted passage distinguishes a mere "wayfarer or officious intervener" from someone with a genuine, deeper concern in a cause, and in context the question ties this quote to a case about workers' rights. Matching the case names to the workers' rights context identifies the right source.
- Malik Brothers v. Narendra Dadhich: This case deals with locus standi in the context of allegations against a public trust's management, not with the rights of industrial workers.
- Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh: This is the well known Dehradun quarrying case concerned with environmental degradation from mining, not workers' rights.
- Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India: This case, brought by a workers' union challenging the sale of a fertiliser plant's machinery, is where the quoted passage about the wayfarer and the busybody appears, addressing precisely the standing of a union or organisation with a genuine stake in workers' interests.
- Sheela Barse v. Union of India: This case concerns the rights and conditions of women prisoners in custody, a different subject from industrial workers' rights.
Only the Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union case both contains this passage and arises in the specific context of workers' rights, which is what the question asks for.
Therefore, the correct answer is Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568.
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Question: 6
Which of the following public interest litigations is related to proper maintenance of cultural heritage of India as also the ecology in the surrounding areas of Taj Mahal?
Which of the following public interest litigations is related to proper maintenance of cultural heritage of India as also the ecology in the surrounding areas of Taj Mahal?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2008) 1 SCC 407.
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 137.
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2016) 4 SCC 269.
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The Correct Option is B
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The correct option is (B) : M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2008) 1 SCC 407.
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Several M.C. Mehta v. Union of India judgments deal with the area around the Taj Mahal, so the question narrows to which specific citation is the one concerned with the cultural heritage and surrounding ecology of the monument.
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237: This citation belongs to a different phase of Mehta's environmental litigation and does not match the Taj heritage and ecology matter being asked about here.
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2008) 1 SCC 407: This is the judgment specifically concerned with the Taj Trapezium Zone, addressing pollution control and preservation measures needed to protect both the Taj Mahal's cultural heritage and the surrounding ecology from industrial and vehicular degradation.
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 137: This citation relates to a separate strand of Mehta's ongoing environmental litigation, not the Taj heritage matter in question.
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2016) 4 SCC 269: This too belongs to a different environmental proceeding and is not the citation tied to the Taj Mahal's heritage and ecology.
Among the several M.C. Mehta matters, it is the (2008) 1 SCC 407 judgment that specifically addresses safeguarding the Taj Mahal's heritage and its surrounding ecological zone.
Therefore, the correct answer is M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2008) 1 SCC 407.
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Top CLAT PG Questions
- Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)] - An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’] - The other material which prompted the High Court to reach the conclusion that the subsoil/minerals vest in the State is … recitals of a patta which ….. states that if minerals are found in the property covered by the patta and if the pattadar exploits those minerals, the pattadar is liable for a separate tax in addition to the tax shown in the patta and …. certain standing orders of the Collector of Malabar which provided for collection of seigniorage fee in the event of the mining operation being carried on. We are of the clear opinion that the recitals in the patta or the Collector’s standing order that the exploitation of mineral wealth in the patta land would attract additional tax, in our opinion, cannot in any way indicate the ownership of the State in the minerals. The power to tax is a necessary incident of sovereign authority (imperium) but not an incident of proprietary rights (dominium). Proprietary right is a compendium of rights consisting of various constituent, rights. If a person has only a share in the produce of some property, it can never be said that such property vests in such a person. In the instant case, the State asserted its ‘right’ to demand a share in the ‘produce of the minerals worked’ though the expression employed is right – it is in fact the Sovereign authority which is asserted. From the language of the BSO No.10 it is clear that such right to demand the share could be exercised only when the pattadar or somebody claiming through the pattadar, extracts/works the minerals – the authority of the State to collect money on the happening of an event – such a demand is more in the nature of an excise duty/a tax. The assertion of authority to collect a duty or tax is in the realm of the sovereign authority, but not a proprietary right….
The only other submission which we are required to deal with before we part with this matter is the argument of the learned counsel for the State that in view of the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereafter ‘MMDRA’) which prohibits under Section 4 the carrying on of any mining activity in this country except in accordance with the permit, licence or mining lease as the case may be, granted under the Act, the appellants cannot claim any proprietary right in the sub-soil…
[Extract from the judgment in Thressiamma Jacob v. Dept. of Mining & Geology, (2013) 9 SCC 725] (hereafter ‘T Jacob’) - A nationwide lockdown was declared by the Central Government from 24 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity came to a grinding halt. The lockdown was extended on several occasions, among them for the second time on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the Labour and Employment Department of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 5 of the Factories Act to exempt all factories registered under the Act “from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers” under Sections 51, 54, 55 and 56. The stated aim of the notification was to provide “certain relaxations for industrial and commercial activities” from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020.
Section 5 of the Factories Act provides that in a public emergency, the State Government can exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of the Act, except Section 67. Section 5 is extracted below: “5. Power to exempt during public emergency. — In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act except section 67 for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: Provided that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section ‘public emergency’ means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance.” (emphasis supplied) The notification in its relevant part is extracted below:
“... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the ‘Factories Act’ PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, –
(1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week.
(2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour.
(3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM.
(4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees).”
[Extract from judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. The State of Gujarat decided on 1 October, 2020, (hereafter ‘GMS’)] - In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter ‘Lalita Kumari’)]
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