Question

Which one of the following statements is correct with respect to the granting of pardon by the President?

• A. The power to grant pardon is a constitutional duty. Hence, judicial review is available, just as any executive action is.
• B. Granting pardon being the privilege of the President, no judicial review is available against the decision of the President in granting or refusing to grant a pardon.
• C. The constitution expressly conferred the power to grant to the President hence, the President is not bound to rely on the aid and advice of the executive.
• D. The President's power to grant pardon can be reviewed on the grounds of non-application of mind.
• A. 60
• B. 30
• C. 14
• D. No such timeline was fixed
• A. Insanity is not a relevant supervening factor for commutation of death sentence.
• B. Right to life of a person continues till his last breath and that Court will protect that right even if the noose is being tied on the condemned person's neck.
• C. The anguish of alternating hope and despair, the agony of uncertainty and the consequence of such suffering on the mental, emotional and physical integrity and health violates Art. 21 of the prisoners.
• D. Article 21 is a substantive right and not merely procedural.
• A. Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT) of Delhi.
• B. V. Sriharan @ Murugan v. Union of India
• C. Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra
• D. Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India
• A. Can be delegated to the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers
• B. Cannot be delegated as it is an essential executive function
• C. Cannot be delegated as it is expressly conferred on the President
• D. Can be delegated to the Vice-president.

Answer 1

The Correct Option is D

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks to identify the correct statement regarding the President's power to grant pardon based on the provided text and established constitutional law.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
Let's analyze each option in light of the passage and legal principles:
(A) This option is incorrect. While the power is a "constitutional responsibility," calling it a "duty" can be misleading. More importantly, judicial review is not available "just as any executive action is"; it is available on very limited grounds. The scope is narrower.
(B) This option is incorrect. The Supreme Court, in cases like Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P., has clearly established that the President's decision on a mercy petition is subject to limited judicial review. It is not an absolute privilege beyond scrutiny.
(C) This option is incorrect and directly contradicts the passage. The text explicitly states, "...the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of Article 74(1) of the Constitution, must act in accordance with such advice." The President is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
(D) This option is correct. The passage concludes by saying, "the absence of any obligation to convey the reasons does not mean that there should not be legitimate or relevant reasons for passing the order." This implies that the decision must be based on reason. It is a well-settled principle that the pardoning power under Article 72 is subject to judicial review on grounds such as the order being passed without application of mind, mala fide, based on extraneous considerations, or being arbitrary.
Step 3: Final Answer:
Based on the analysis, the statement that the President's power to grant pardon can be reviewed on the grounds of non-application of mind is correct.

Answer 2

The question asks which statement about the President's pardon power is correct, tested against the passage and the settled position on judicial review of Article 72. Checking each statement in turn narrows this to one option.

1. Option A (a duty, reviewable like any executive action): Judicial review of the pardon power is not as broad as review of ordinary executive action; courts have confined themselves to a narrow set of grounds rather than reviewing the merits generally. Calling it reviewable just as any executive action is overstates the scope of review. Ruled out.
2. Option B (a privilege beyond any judicial review): This is ruled out because it treats the power as entirely immune from scrutiny, but the passage itself notes that the absence of any obligation to convey reasons does not mean legitimate or relevant reasons need not exist, which only makes sense if courts can check whether such reasons exist.
3. Option C (President not bound by aid and advice): This directly contradicts the passage, which states that the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who, subject to Article 74(1), must act in accordance with such advice. Ruled out.
4. Option D (reviewable on non-application of mind): The passage's closing point, that legitimate or relevant reasons must underlie the order even without an obligation to disclose them, is consistent with limited review on grounds such as non-application of mind, mala fide, or reliance on irrelevant considerations. This survives scrutiny.

With A overstating the scope of review, B denying review altogether, and C contradicting the passage's own words on aid and advice, option D fits both the text and the settled narrow review position.

So the correct answer is option D.

Answer 3

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks for the specific minimum time period mandated by the Supreme Court in the case of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India between the communication of the rejection of a mercy petition and the date of execution.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The judgment in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) laid down several guidelines to protect the rights of death row convicts, flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution (Right to Life and Personal Liberty). One of the key procedural safeguards introduced was to ensure that the convict has a reasonable amount of time after the final rejection of his/her mercy petition. This period allows the convict to prepare mentally, settle worldly affairs, and meet with family members one last time. The Supreme Court held that a minimum period of 14 days must elapse between the receipt of the communication of the rejection of the mercy petition and the scheduled date of execution.
Step 3: Final Answer:
Therefore, the Supreme Court stipulated a minimum period of 14 days.

Answer 4

The question asks for the specific minimum gap the Supreme Court fixed between the rejection of a mercy petition and an execution. Ruling out the numbers not tied to that guideline narrows this down.

1. Option A (60 days): No procedural safeguard laid down in this line of cases sets a 60 day gap; this figure does not correspond to the recognised guideline. Ruled out.
2. Option B (30 days): Thirty days is likewise not the figure fixed by the Court for the gap between rejection of a mercy plea and execution. Ruled out.
3. Option C (14 days): This matches the guideline actually laid down, a minimum of 14 days must pass between the convict receiving communication of the rejection and the scheduled execution, giving the convict time to prepare mentally, settle affairs, and meet family.
4. Option D (no such timeline was fixed): This is incorrect because a specific numerical safeguard was in fact laid down as part of the broader set of Article 21 based procedural protections for death row convicts.

Since 60 days and 30 days do not correspond to any recognised figure, and a timeline clearly was fixed, the 14 day period in option C is the one actually laid down.

So the correct answer is option C.

Answer 5

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks to identify the incorrect statement regarding the interplay between the pardoning power and Article 21 of the Constitution.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
Let's evaluate each statement:
(A) This statement is false. The Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India explicitly held that post-conviction insanity or mental illness is a supervening circumstance that renders the execution of a death sentence unconstitutional under Article 21. Therefore, insanity is a very relevant factor for the commutation of a death sentence. Since the statement claims it is "not a relevant factor," it is "not true".
(B) This statement is true. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to a dignified life until the very end, and this protection does not cease until the person is legally pronounced dead.
(C) This statement is true. This describes the "death row phenomenon." The Supreme Court has held that inordinate and unexplained delay in deciding a mercy petition causes immense mental anguish, which violates the prisoner's right to life under Article 21, and can be a ground for commutation.
(D) This statement is true. Article 21 is the bedrock of fundamental rights, guaranteeing the substantive right to life and personal liberty, not just a set of procedures. The procedures established by law must also be fair, just, and reasonable.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The statement that is not true is (A), as insanity is a crucial supervening factor for the commutation of a death sentence.

Answer 6

The question asks which statement about the pardoning power and Article 21 is not true, so each option needs to be checked for accuracy against settled constitutional law on death row convicts.

1. Option A (insanity not a relevant factor for commutation): This statement is false. Post-conviction insanity or serious mental illness is treated as a supervening circumstance that makes carrying out a death sentence unconstitutional, because Article 21 protects the dignity of the condemned person even after conviction. Since the option claims insanity is not relevant, and it clearly is relevant, this statement fails the accuracy check.
2. Option B (right to life continues till last breath): This statement holds up; courts have consistently protected the condemned person's right to life and dignity right up to the moment of execution, not merely up to conviction or sentencing.
3. Option C (anguish of alternating hope and despair violates Article 21): This statement also holds up; prolonged, unexplained delay and the resulting psychological suffering on a convict have been recognised as violating Article 21's guarantee of a dignified life.
4. Option D (Article 21 is substantive, not merely procedural): This statement holds up as well; Article 21 guarantees an actual substantive right to life and liberty, not just a promise that some procedure, however unfair, will be followed.

Since B, C and D each check out as accurate statements, and A is the one statement that misdescribes the settled position on insanity as a supervening factor, A is the false statement the question is looking for.

So the correct answer is option A.

Answer 7

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks to identify the specific Supreme Court case that created an exception to the 'delay' rule for commutation of the death penalty, particularly in cases of terrorism or brutal mass killings.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
(A) Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT) of Delhi (2013): In this case, the Supreme Court held that in cases where the crime is related to terrorism and poses a threat to the sovereignty and integrity of the nation, the ground of inordinate delay in deciding a mercy petition may not be sufficient for commuting the death sentence. This judgment carved out an exception to the general rule.
(B) V. Sriharan @ Murugan v. Union of India: This case primarily dealt with the scope of the power of remission under the CrPC and the primacy of the Union Government's opinion in certain cases, particularly in the context of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination convicts.
(C) Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra: While the gravity of the crime (1993 Mumbai blasts) was a central factor in the rejection of his final pleas, the primary legal precedent for the principle in question was set in the Bhullar case.
(D) Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014): This case did the opposite. A larger bench of the Supreme Court in this case overruled the exception created in the Devender Pal Singh Bhullar case. It held that inordinate delay in disposal of mercy petitions is a ground for commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment, irrespective of the nature of the crime.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The case that held that delay cannot be the sole factor for commutation in heinous crimes like terrorism was Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT) of Delhi.

Answer 8

The question asks which case held that delay cannot, by itself, justify commuting a death sentence for a brutal, heinous crime involving mass killing without reason. Checking what each case is actually known for narrows this down.

1. Option A (Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT) of Delhi): This case dealt with a terrorism related conviction and held that where a crime threatens the sovereignty and integrity of the nation through mass, motiveless killing, delay in deciding the mercy petition alone is not a sufficient ground for commutation. This matches the description exactly.
2. Option B (V. Sriharan @ Murugan v. Union of India): This case is chiefly about the scope of the power of remission under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the primacy of the Union Government's view in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination matter, not about the delay versus commutation question. Ruled out as addressing a different issue.
3. Option C (Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra): This case involved the 1993 Mumbai blasts, and the gravity of the crime featured in the rejection of his final pleas, but the specific principle that delay alone cannot justify commutation for such crimes was established earlier, in the Bhullar line, not originated here. Ruled out as not being the source case.
4. Option D (Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India): This case did the reverse of what the question describes; a larger bench overruled the exception carved out in Bhullar and held that inordinate delay is a ground for commutation regardless of the nature of the crime. Ruled out as stating the opposite rule.

B and C address different issues altogether, and D states the opposite rule, leaving option A as the case that actually holds what the question describes.

So the correct answer is option A.

Answer 9

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks about the delegability of the President's power to grant pardons under Article 72 of the Constitution.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The principle of delegatus non potest delegare (a delegate cannot further delegate) applies to powers conferred by the Constitution on specific authorities. Article 72 of the Constitution of India explicitly vests the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment in the President.
(A) This is incorrect. While the President acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, the power is formally vested in the President and cannot be delegated to the Prime Minister or the Council. They advise, but the constitutional authority to act remains with the President.
(B) This is plausible, but not the most precise reason. While it is an executive function, the primary reason for its non-delegability is its specific constitutional conferment.
(C) This is the most accurate and fundamental reason. The Constitution itself has chosen to confer this high power specifically on the Head of the State, the President. Such an express and specific grant of power to a designated constitutional authority implies that it cannot be delegated to any other person or body unless the Constitution itself allows for it, which it does not.
(D) This is incorrect. There is no constitutional provision that allows the President to delegate this power to the Vice-President.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The President's power to grant a pardon cannot be delegated because it is a power expressly conferred on the President by the Constitution.

Answer 10

The question asks why the President's pardon power under Article 72 cannot be handed off to someone else. Testing each option isolates the actual constitutional reason.

1. Option A (can be delegated to the PM and Council of Ministers): This is wrong on its face; while the Council advises the President on how to exercise the power, the power itself stays with the President and is never formally handed over to the Council or the Prime Minister to exercise in his place.
2. Option B (cannot be delegated as an essential executive function): Calling it non delegable simply because it is executive is too broad, since many executive functions are in fact delegated in Indian constitutional practice; being an executive function alone does not explain why this particular power stays fixed to one office.
3. Option C (cannot be delegated as it is expressly conferred on the President): This is the more precise reason. Article 72 names the President specifically as the holder of the pardon power. When the Constitution expressly assigns a power to a named office, that office cannot simply reassign it elsewhere without a further constitutional provision allowing it, and none exists here.
4. Option D (can be delegated to the Vice-President): No provision anywhere in the Constitution allows this; the Vice-President's own constitutional role does not include stepping into the President's pardon power.

A and D invent transfers that no provision supports, and B gives too general a reason, leaving option C as the precise constitutional basis for non-delegability.

So the correct answer is option C.