List of top Legal Studies Questions asked in Telangana State Law Common Entrance Test

The law of insurance, rooted in the general principles of contract law, is governed by doctrines distinctively evolved to reflect its aleatory nature. Insurance contracts are contracts uberrimae fidei. The insured is required to disclose all material facts that may influence the judgment of a prudent insurer. It must be noted that suppression of the truth is equivalent to the suggestion of falsehood. Unlike commutative contracts, insurance agreements are aleatory, where performance depends on uncertain events. The principle of indemnity ensures that the insured is restored to the financial position prior to loss, negating unjust enrichment. It is applicable in marine insurance, fire insurance, home insurance etc. However, in life insurance, the indemnity principle is relaxed due to its classification as a contingent contract, enforceable upon the assured event, not actual loss. 

The doctrine of insurable interest is pivotal. It mandates that the insured must have a legally recognized interest in the subject matter at the time of loss or at inception in life insurance, failing which, the contract is void ab initio. Additionally, the principle of subrogation entitles the insurer, upon indemnification, to step into the shoes of the insured and recover from third parties. In the interpretation of insurance contracts, ambiguities are construed against the drafter, which is typically the insurer. Courts prioritize the reasonable expectations of the insured, provided there is no breach of disclosure duties.

Theories of statutory interpretation form the bedrock of judicial hermeneutics, particularly in common law systems where judicial exposition coexists with legislative supremacy. At the foundational level, the literal rule posits that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court is bound to give effect to the text, even if it leads to inconvenient consequences. This approach is based on the maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum. However, the golden rule permits departure from the literal meaning to avert absurdity. This rule acknowledges the imperfection of legislative drafting and underscores the principle noscitur a sociis, which means a word is known by the company it keeps. 

More dynamic is the mischief rule, originating from Heydon’s Case, which directs the court to examine the defect or mischief in prior law that legislation intended to cure. It empowers courts to consider extrinsic aids, including Law Commission reports and legislative debates. In the constitutional domain, the purposive approach was employed in landmark cases such as Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. This interpretation approach prioritizes the spirit over the letter of the law and affirms transformative constitutionalism. Amidst this interpretive elasticity, the judiciary remains constrained by the maxim judicis est jus dicere non dare, which stipulates that the judge’s role is to declare law, but not legislate.