Question

Principle: A person, who is usually mad, but occasionally not mad, may make a contract when he is not mad.
Facts: ‘A’ generally remains in the state of madness and rarely becomes capable of understanding anything.

• A. A can make a contract.
• B. A can never make a contract.
• C. A can make a contract at any time whenever he pleases.
• D. A can make a contract only for his own benefit.

Hint:

The key is that the person must be in a state of mind capable of understanding the contract at the time of making it.

Answer 1

The Correct Option is A

The principle clearly states that a person who is not mad can make a contract. While A is usually in the state of madness, it is possible for A to occasionally be in a sane state and capable of understanding. Therefore, A is allowed to make a contract when A is not mad.
Option (A) is correct because it is based on the assumption that A is temporarily capable of understanding and making decisions.
Option (B) is incorrect as it dismisses A’s ability to contract during the rare periods when A is sane. Option (C) is incorrect because it implies that A can contract at any time, regardless of being sane or not. Option (D) is incorrect as it restricts the benefit of the contract to A alone, which is not mentioned in the principle.

Answer 2

This question checks whether a person who is usually of unsound mind can ever validly contract, based strictly on the principle given. Let's test each option.

1. A can make a contract: The principle allows a person who is usually mad but occasionally lucid to contract during the periods when he is not mad. The facts tell us A rarely becomes capable of understanding, which means such lucid moments do exist, even if infrequent. During those windows, A satisfies the exact condition the principle requires, so a contract made by A at such a time is valid.
2. A can never make a contract: This ignores the rare periods of clarity the facts themselves describe. The principle does not disqualify a person entirely merely because unsoundness is the general state; it only requires that the specific act of contracting happen during a lucid interval.
3. A can make a contract at any time whenever he pleases: This overstates A's capacity. The principle restricts valid contracting strictly to the moments A is not mad; it does not grant A a general, unconditional freedom to contract regardless of his mental state at the time.
4. A can make a contract only for his own benefit: The principle contains no such restriction on the purpose or beneficiary of the contract; it speaks only about the mental state required at the time of contracting, not about who the contract must benefit.

Because the principle conditions validity purely on the person's mental state at the moment of contracting, and the facts confirm A does have rare lucid moments, A retains the capacity to contract during those moments.

Therefore, the correct answer is A can make a contract.

Answer 3

The principle sets out two conditions that must both be true before a contract by such a person is valid: the person must be someone whose general state is madness, and the person must also have moments where he is not mad, with the contract needing to fall inside one of those moments. Testing the options against these two conditions in turn.

1. A can make a contract: Checking condition one, A's facts state he generally remains in a state of madness, that condition is met. Checking condition two, A rarely becomes capable of understanding, so the lucid state does exist, however uncommon it might be. Since both conditions the principle sets are satisfied, a contract made in one of those rare capable moments is exactly what the principle authorises.
2. A can never make a contract: For this to be right, condition two would have to fail entirely, meaning A would never regain capacity. But the facts affirmatively describe A as rarely capable, not never capable, so this option denies a condition the facts themselves confirm exists.
3. A can make a contract at any time whenever he pleases: This option drops condition two altogether, treating the timing requirement as irrelevant. The principle does not free the person from needing to be in the lucid state; it only permits contracting during it, so removing that requirement overstates what the rule allows.
4. A can make a contract only for his own benefit: This introduces a third condition, about who benefits, that appears nowhere in the two conditions the principle actually lays down. Since the principle is silent on beneficiary, adding that requirement has no basis.

Both conditions built into the principle, a generally unsound mind paired with occasional lucid capacity, are met on these facts, so A retains the capacity to contract in his lucid moments.

Therefore, the correct answer is A can make a contract.