List of top Legal Studies Questions on Criminal Law asked in CLAT PG

Define dual criminality and speciality.

What is the Extradition Act, 1962 — name a key procedure?

Given facts: Country A requests the surrender of X for murder; Country B’s offence list doesn’t include an identical offence. Is extradition possible? (Discuss dual criminality and prima facie test.)

True or False: “An accused has an absolute right to demand a narco-analysis test.”

Compare Arnesh Kumar with newer BNSS provisions — what stayed the same, what changed?

Analyse Prabir Purkayastha (2024) and how it changes the law of remand/grounds of arrest.

If a person is arrested under UAPA and not given written grounds of arrest, can he be remanded or must he be released?

Which Section requires police to record reasons for arrest?

Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer (1956 SCR 199) the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: “This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and section 106 is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are ‘especially’ within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word ‘especially’ underscores facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. It added, if the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than him whether he did or did not.” It is evident that it cannot be the intention and Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on the accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. the King. 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R, 1936-3 All ER 36 at p.49 (B). In case resting on circumstantial evidence, an accused person’s failure to provide a reasonable explanation as required by S. 106 could serve as an additional link in the chain of circumstances.
(Based on facts from State of West Bengal vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors, AIR 2000SUPREME COURT 2988)

Dominic Ongwen, a former commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, was convicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in February 2021. The case marked a significant milestone in international criminal law, focusing on issues of child soldiering, forced marriage, and sexual and gender-based violence. Ongwen was found guilty of 61 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, torture, enslavement, forced marriage, rape, and conscription of children under the age of 15 into armed groups. The ICC’s judgment emphasized the importance of accountability for leaders who exploit children in conflicts and commit sexual and gender-based crimes.
A critical aspect of the judgment was the consideration of Ongwen’s own history as a child soldier. Ongwen was abducted by the LRA at around the age of nine and was forced to commit atrocities as he rose through the ranks. The court balanced this background against the gravity of his crimes, ultimately ruling that his personal history did not absolve him of responsibility for his actions as an adult commander. The judgment is also notable for its comprehensive approach to reparations for victims. The ICC ordered collective reparations, including symbolic measures like memorials, physical and psychological rehabilitation, and financial compensation to support the victims and their communities. This case reinforces the ICC’s commitment to addressing serious international crimes, particularly those involving vulnerable populations such as children and women and underscores the principles of justice and reparation in international criminal law.
(This extract is taken from Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen (ICC, 2021))

“There is no gainsaying that an able bodied youthful Jawan when physically assaulted by his superior may be in a state of provocation. The gravity of such a provocation may be heightened if the physical beating was meant to force him to submit to unnatural carnal intercourse to satisfy the superior’s lust. The store room incident involving the appellant and the deceased is alleged to have taken place when the deceased had bolted the door of the store room to keep out any intruder from seeing what was happening inside. By any standard the act of a superior to humiliate and force his subordinate in a closed room to succumb to the lustful design of the former was a potent recipe for anyone placed in the appellant’s position to revolt and retaliate against the treatment being given to him. What may have happened inside the store room if the appellant had indeed revolted and retaliated against the unbecoming conduct of the deceased is a matter of conjecture. The appellant or any one in his position may have retaliated violently to the grave peril of his tormentor. The fact of the matter, however, is that the appellant appears to have borne the assault without any retaliation against the deceased-superior and somehow managed to escape from the room…All that the evidence proves is that after the said incident
the appellant was seen crying and depressed and when asked by his colleagues, he is said to have narrated his tale of humiliation at the hands of the deceased…. That appears to have happened in the present case also for the appellant’s version is that he and his colleagues had planned to avenge the humiliation by beating up the deceased in the evening when they all assemble near the water heating point. That apart, the appellant attended to his normal duty during the day time and after the evening dinner, went to perform his guard duty at 2100 hrs.”
[Extracted from B.D Khunte v. Union of India, Criminal Appeal No. 2328 of 2014, para 12-13].

On repeal of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and on the enforcement of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, the procedure to be followed when a claim of juvenility is raised before any court, other than a Board is stipulated under Section 9(2) and (3). The same reads as ‘‘In case a person alleged to have committed an offence claims before a court other than a Board, that the person is a child or was a child on the date of commission of the offence, or if the court itself is of the opinion that the person was a child on the date of commission of the offence, the said court shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding on the matter, stating the age of the person as nearly as may be: Provided that such a claim may be raised before any court and it shall be recognized at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and such a claim shall be determined in accordance with the provisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder even if the person has ceased to be a child on or before the date of commencement of this Act. If the court finds that a person has committed an offence and was a child on the date of commission of such offence, it shall forward the child to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the sentence, if any, passed by the court shall be deemed to have no effect.”

In cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances which lead to the conclusion of guilt should be in the first instance fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be shown that within all human probability the act must have been committed by the accused.

In Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 382, the court analysed the ambit of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and also the scope of the expression ‘arrest’ contained therein and also under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). ‘Arrest’ may be classified into two categories, namely, the arrest under a warrant issued by a court and arrest without warrant. Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly directs that the investigation should be completed in the first instance within 24 hours; if not the arrested person should be brought before a Magistrate as provided under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Turning now to Article 22(1) and (2), we must ascertain whether its protection extends to both categories of arrests mentioned above, and, if not, then which one of them comes within its protection. There can be no matter of doubt that arrests without warrants issued by a court call for greater protection than do arrests under such warrants. The provision that the arrested person should within 24 hours be produced before the nearest Magistrate is particularly desirable in the case of arrest otherwise than under a warrant issued by the court, for it ensures the immediate application of a judicial mind to the legal authority of the person making the arrest and the regularity of the procedure adopted by him. In the case of arrest under a warrant issued by a court, the judicial mind had already been applied to the case when the warrant was issued and, therefore, there is less reason for making such production in that case a matter of a substantive fundamental right. The matter of ‘House Arrest’ was deliberated by the court as: “There can be no quarrel with the proposition that a court cannot remand a person unless the court is authorised to do so by law. We are of the view, that in the facts of this case, the house arrest was not ordered purporting to be under Section 167. We observe that under Section 167 in appropriate cases it will be open to courts to order house arrest.”

There is a difference between grant of bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and grant of bail, post-conviction. In the earlier case, there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by the Court in Dataram Singh v. State of UP, [(2018) 3 SCC 22]. However, in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) provides that any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the CrPC, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person ‘if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case’. The true test, therefore, is whether it appears to the Court that the evidence of such person who is sought to be recalled is essential to the just decision of the case. The scope and object of the provision is to enable the court to determine the truth and to render a just decision after discovering all relevant facts and obtaining proper proof of such facts, to arrive at a just decision of the case. Power must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to undesirable results. The power conferred under Section 311 of the CrPC must therefore, be invoked by the court only in order to meet the ends of justice, for strong and valid reasons, and the same must be exercised with great caution and circumspection.

Judges can play a significant role in ridding the justice system of harmful stereotypes. They have an important responsibility to base their decisions on law and facts in evidence, and not engage in gender stereotyping. The Supreme Court of India observed that recently, the Courts across the country, have started imposing irrelevant conditions while granting bail. The conditions that can be imposed under the law are clearly laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and by the Supreme Court through its various decisions. Accordingly, it is clear that imposing conditions like rendering community service in COVID hospitals or in any other institution, plantation of trees, contributing to any particular charity relief fund, etc. is impermissible in law. While deciding a bail application, accused cannot assume the role of a social reformer or fund raiser for charities and imposed with conditions which have no nexus with the offence or relevance with the object of the bail provisions. During pendency of the trial accused is presumed innocent and his guilt is yet to be adjudicated by the Court. Imposing irrelevant conditions is violative of the right to equality and personal liberty, including procedure established by law. Such wide prevalence necessitates the urgent intervention of the court to declare that such remarks are unacceptable and have the potential to cause grave harm to the prosecutrix and the society at large; and to issue directions on gender sensitization of the bar and the bench, particularly with regard to judicial empathy for the prosecutrix…judicial stereotyping is a common and pernicious barrier to justice, particularly for women victims and survivors of violence. Such stereotyping causes judges to reach a view about cases based on preconceived beliefs, rather than relevant facts and actual enquiry. This requires judges to identify gender stereotyping, and identify how the application, enforcement or perpetuation of these stereotypes discriminates against women or denies them equal access to justice.

The Supreme Court of India, in Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v. State of Gujarat, [2018 SCC OnLine SC 2300] was examining a question where a court, after grant of bail to an accused, ordered the accused and their relatives to undergo scientific test viz. lie detector, brain mapping and narco-analysis. This Court held that direction of the court to carry out such tests is not only in contravention to the first principles of criminal law jurisprudence but also violates statutory requirements. The Court held: “While adjudicating a bail application, Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the guiding principle wherein Court takes into consideration, inter alia, the gravity of the crime, the character of the evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and obstructing the course of justice and such other grounds. Each criminal case presents its own peculiar factual matrix, and therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court. However, the court has to only opine as to whether there is prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police, or rather order specific tests as done in the present case. In the instant case, by ordering the abovementioned tests, the High Court has converted the adjudication of a bail matter to that of a mini-trial indeed.”

Criminal law is the most direct expression of the relationship between a state and its citizens. Criminal sanction is indeed the most coercive method of regulating an individual‘s behaviour which any state may deploy. The degree of coercion under criminal law is qualitatively different from the outcome in a dispute under civil law. The purpose of criminal law is to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests. Feinberg explains the harm principle in following words: 'It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor and there is probably no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to other values'.

Outraging the modesty of a woman is punishable under:

To commit an affray, the minimum number of persons required is:

When two or more persons agree to do an illegal act, such an act is known as:

A person abets the doing of a thing by:

The right of private defense of property against theft continues till:

X, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill Y.