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The Supreme Court of India observed that, while appreciating the existence of the right to peaceful protest against a legislation ……., we have to make it unequivocally clear that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied in such a manner and that too indefinitely. Democracy and dissent go hand in hand, but then the demonstrations expressing dissent must be in designated places alone. The present case was not even one of protests taking place in an undesignated area but was a blockage of a public way which caused grave inconvenience to commuters. We cannot accept the plea of the applicants that an indeterminable number of people can assemble whenever they choose to protest.
Question: 1
Which of the following judgments relating to right to peaceful protest has the above excerpt been taken from?
Which of the following judgments relating to right to peaceful protest has the above excerpt been taken from?
Updated On: Jul 11, 2024
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 648.
- Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 266.
- Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637.
- Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 439.
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The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
The Correct Answe is option (C): Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 439.
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Question: 2
Which of the following judgments is not related to right to assemble as enshrined under the Constitution of India?
Which of the following judgments is not related to right to assemble as enshrined under the Constitution of India?
Updated On: Jul 11, 2024
- Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324.
- Sampurna Behura v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 433.
- Bimal Gurung v. Union of India, (2018) 15 SCC 480.
- Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2016) 15 SCC 525.
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
The Correct Answe is option (B): Sampurna Behura v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 433.
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Question: 3
As per the judgment of In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident, (2012) 5 SCC 1, which of the following statement is not correct?
As per the judgment of In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident, (2012) 5 SCC 1, which of the following statement is not correct?
Updated On: Aug 22, 2024
- Right to sleep is not a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
- An individual is entitled to sleep as comfortably and as freely as he breathes.
- Sleep, is a fundamental and basic requirement without which the existence of life would be in peril.
- State’s compelling interest in regulation of subject was discussed in this case.
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The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The Correct Answe is option (A): Right to sleep is not a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
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Question: 4
Which of the following statement is not correct in relation to right to assemble under the Constitution of India?
Which of the following statement is not correct in relation to right to assemble under the Constitution of India?
Updated On: Aug 22, 2024
- The assembly should be peaceful.
- Reasonable restrictions stated under Article 19 for right to assemble are sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, morality.
- The assembly should be without arms.
- Reasonable restrictions on right to assemble are provided in Article 19(3) of the Constitution of India.
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
The Correct Answe is option (B): Reasonable restrictions stated under Article 19 for right to assemble are sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, morality.
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Question: 5
The rule prohibiting demonstrations by government servants was discussed in which of the following judgments?
The rule prohibiting demonstrations by government servants was discussed in which of the following judgments?
Updated On: Jul 11, 2024
- Union of India v. Naveen Jindal, (2004) 2 SCC 510.
- Ram Bahadur Rai v. State of Bihar, AIR 1975 SC 223.
- Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166
- Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106.
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The Correct Answe is option (C): Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166
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Question: 6
Which of the following judges of the Supreme Court of India were part of the Bench in the judgment as given in the excerpt?
Which of the following judges of the Supreme Court of India were part of the Bench in the judgment as given in the excerpt?
Updated On: Jul 11, 2024
- Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose and Indira Banerjee, JJ.
- Aniruddha Bose and Krishna Murari, JJ.
- Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose and Krishna Murari, JJ.
- Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Krishna Murari, JJ.
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The Correct Answe is option (C): Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose and Krishna Murari, JJ.
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Top Questions on Important Judgments
- An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’]- CLAT PG - 2023
- Legal Studies
- Important Judgments
- Until 2017, India did not have a codified law to order internet shut downs. A general power was vested in District Magistrates in this regard. The Magistrate could issue an order ordering a shut down if a ‘speedy remedy’ (extending to internet shut down) is desirable for ‘immediate prevention’ of an event. The Magistrate had to be satisfied that the order is ‘likely to prevent or tends to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of public tranquillity’. The Magistrate’s order cannot be for longer than two months.
In 2017, new rules to order internet shut downs were introduced taking the power away from the Magistrate. These rules — the Temporary Suspension Rules — state that internet shut downs can now only be ordered by the Home Secretary of the Union or State Governments. Only in “unavoidable circumstances” can the passing of orders be delegated to someone lower than the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India. And even in this case, the official must be authorised by the Centre or State Home Secretary. Shut downs can be ordered where ‘necessary’ or ‘unavoidable’ during a ‘public emergency’ or in the ‘interest of public safety’. Shut down orders must necessarily detail the reasons to shut down the internet. The orders must also be sent to a review committee under the state or central government within 24 hours. The committee must then review them within five working days. The rules state that apart from the Chief Secretary and Legal Secretary, the committee can comprise a secretary other than the home secretary.
In January 2020 the Supreme Court passed its judgement in the case of Anuradha Bhasin. The judgement in this case explicitly recognised two things: that the freedom to access information is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India (which protects the freedom of speech and expression); and that the freedom to conduct your trade, profession or business over the internet is also a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India (which protects the freedom to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business). Every time the internet is suspended, it is quite obvious that it is a violation of these rights. These rights can only be curtailed in the interest of the ‘sovereignty and security of the state, integrity of the nation, friendly relations with foreign states, or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence’. The Supreme Court’s judgement in Anuradha Bhasin’s case had also underlined that shut down orders must clearly provide reasons for the shut down and they must be publicly available.
[Extracted with edits and revisions from “In India, are internet shut downs in accordance with law? Not always”, by Diksha Munjal, News Laundry]- CLAT - 2023
- Legal Studies
- Important Judgments
- Twitter’s lawyer on October 27, said before the Karnataka High Court that Union government orders to block certain Twitter handles and posts must contain reasons for the same that can be communicated to users of the microblogging site. He said this applies to all blocking orders sent to social media platforms. The lawyer representing Twitter said that reasons for the blocking order must be provided to users so they can determine whether or not they want to challenge the orders.
Challenging the blocking orders, Twitter’s July 5 petition contended that several blocking orders “demonstrate excessive use of powers and are disproportionate”. Such orders can only be issued by the Union government and not the state governments, he said, which increases the danger of such abuse. Twitter also claimed that the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology had sent it a letter threatening consequences for failing to comply with the blocking orders, such as criminal proceedings against the company’s chief compliance officer and the stripping away of Twitter’s safe harbour immunity, otherwise available to social media platforms under Section 79(1) of the Information Technology Act (the “IT Act”). Note that the Government has the power to strip away such safe harbour immunity under the IT Act. Further, in a previous hearing, Twitter’s lawyer said that the company was asked to block entire accounts, although Section 69A of the IT Act does not permit blocking of the whole account. It only permits the blocking of information, or a particular tweet or post. It argued that the Union government’s direction to block whole accounts will affect its business, adding that several prominent persons have their accounts on the platform.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “ ‘Government Must Provide Reasons for Blocking User Accounts,’ Twitter Tells Karnataka HC”, The Wire]- CLAT - 2023
- Legal Studies
- Important Judgments
- Assume that the statements in the passages are the applicable law.
Quashing a case of cruelty that was filed against a man by his wife, the Bombay High Court said that if a married lady is asked to do household work for the family, it cannot be said that she is treated “like a maid servant”. The Court was hearing an application by the husband and his parents seeking that proceedings against them are quashed. A First Information Report (“FIR”) was filed against the trio in September 2020, around nine months after the marriage, alleging that they hounded the woman for money to purchase a car, harassed her mentally and physically and treated her like a maid servant. Examining the evidence, the Court found that there was no merit to the woman’s allegations. The Court said that though the FIR says that she was treated properly for about a month and then “like a maid servant”, there are no details of what this meant. The Court added: “If a married lady is asked to do household work for the purpose of the family, it cannot be said that it is like a maid servant.” The Court held that the mere use of the word harassment “mentally and physically” in the FIR is not sufficient to constitute an offence Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”), which punishes the husband, or a relative of the husband of a woman who subjects her to cruelty in any way. It is interesting to note that Section 498A of the IPC also provides that if a married woman is actually treated like a ‘maid servant’, it would be an offence under that Section.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “If Wife Is Asked To Do Household Work, Does Not Mean She Is Treated Like Maid: Bombay HC”, The Wire]- CLAT - 2023
- Legal Studies
- Important Judgments
- Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act, which need not be a long gap. To bring common intention into effect a pre-concert is not necessarily be proved, but it may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons and could be inferred from facts and circumstances of each case. For example A and B caught hold of C where only B stabbed C with a knife but A is also liable for murder as there was a pre concerted action. In the case Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, Supreme court emphasized on this point that prior concert need not be something always very much prior to the incident, but could well be something that may develop on the spot, on the spur of the moment.
Common Intention and Similar Intention
Common intention does not mean similar intention of several persons. To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be known to the rest of them and shared by them. In the case of Dukhmochan Pandey v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court, held that: “Common intention which developed at the spur of the moment is different from the similar intention actuated a number of person at the same time….the distinction between a common intention and similar intention may be fine, but is nonetheless a real one and if overlooked, may lead to miscarriage of justice….” The mere presence of accused together is not sufficient to hold that they shared the common intention to commit the offence in question. It is necessary that the intention of each one of 'several persons‘ be known to each other for constituting common intention.- CLAT - 2020
- Legal Studies
- Important Judgments
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Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam
- An unpleasant tussle ensured between the TATA Sons and Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (“CPM”) in October 2016, when Mistry, who was the sixth chairman of Tata Sons, was ousted from the position of Executive Chairman of Tata Sons Limited. CPM took over as the chairman in 2012 after Ratan Tata announced his retirement. Tata Group patriarch Ratan Tata had personally asked Cyrus Mistry to resign as chairman of Tata Sons as the board had lost faith in him, but his refusal led to the removal via majority vote. Cyrus Investments Private limited and Sterling Investment Corporation Private Limited belonged to the Shapoorji Palloni Group in which CPM held a controlling interest (about 2% of the issued share capital of Tata Sons). Seven out of the nine directors of Tata Sons voted for CPM’s replacement after Farida Khambata abstained and Mistry was declared ineligible to vote as he was an interested director. Mistry challenged his removal, accusing the board of mismanagement and of oppressing minority shareholders. however, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) rejected his petition. After this Mistry challenged his removal in National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In 2018, NCLAT order restored Mistry as the group’s executive chairman. Tata Sons challenged that NCLAT order in Supreme Court. CPM also challenged the order for few more relief. Supreme Court stayed NCLAT’s order reinstating Cyrus Mistry as the executive chairman of Tata Sons and restoring his directorships in the holding company as well as three group companies, with a preliminary observation that the first impression of the order was “not good” and that the tribunal ‘could’ not have given consequential relief that had not been sought in the first place. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided the case in favour of Tata Sons. One of the issues decided by Supreme Court was that “whether the case was fit to be qualified as a situation of ‘Oppression and Mismanagement’ under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013?”. On this issue, the Supreme Court observed that “unless the removal of a person as a chairman of a company is oppressive or mismanaged or done in a prejudicial manner damaging the interests of the company, its members or the public at large, the NCLT cannot interfere with the removal of a person as a Chairman of a Company in a petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013.” This case highlighted the point that “an executive chairman does not have sovereign authority over the company. In corporate democracy, decision making always remains with the Board as long as they enjoy the pleasure of the shareholders. Likewise, an executive chairman will continue as long as he/she enjoys the pleasure of the Board. An assumption by the executive chairman that he/she would have a free hand in running the affairs of the company is incongruous to corporate governance and corporate democracy. The Tribunal held that the concept of ‘free hand rule’ is antithesis to collective responsibility and collective decision making”.
[Based on Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investment Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC 122].- CLAT PG - 2024
- Company Law
- Alastair Hudson in his book ‘Securities Law’ First Edition (Sweet & Maxwell), 2008 at page 342, refers to ‘Restricted Offers’ and noticed that there is no contravention of Section 85 of FSMA 2000, if: “(b) the offer is made to or directed at fewer than 100 persons, other than qualified investors, per EEA State”. The purpose underlying that exemption, the author says, is mainly the fact that the offer is not being made to an appreciable section of “the public” such that the policy of the prospectus rules generally is not affected. Further, the author says that “Self-evidently, while an offer to 99 ordinary members of the public would be within the literal terms of the exemption, it would not be the sort of activity anticipated by the legislation. Moreover, if a marketing campaign were arranged such that ordinary members of the people were approached in groups of 99 people at a time in an effort to avoid the prospectus rules, then that would not appear to be within the spirit of the regulations and might be held to contravene the core principle that a regulated person must act with integrity.”
I may, therefore, indicate, subject to what has been stated above, in India that any share or debenture issue beyond forty-nine persons, would be a public issue attracting all the relevant provisions of the SEBI Act, regulations framed thereunder, the Companies Act, pertaining to the public issue. Facts clearly reveal that Saharas have issued securities to the public more than the threshold limit statutorily fixed under the first proviso to Section 67(3) and hence violated the listing provisions which may attract civil and criminal liabilities. Principles of listing, which I may later on discuss, is intended to assist public companies in identifying their obligations and responsibilities, which are continuing in nature, transparent in content and call for high degree of integrity. Obligations are imposed on the issuer on an ongoing basis. Public companies who are legally obliged to list their securities are deemed to accept the continuing obligations, by virtue of their application, prospectus and the subsequent maintenance of listing on a recognized stock exchange. Disclosure is the rule, there is no exception. Misleading public is a serious crime, which may attract civil and criminal liability. Listing of securities depends not upon one’s volition, but on statutory mandate.
[Extract from Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Para 89-91, Civil Appeal No. 9833/2011 (SC)]- CLAT PG - 2024
- Company Law
- The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem).
Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned.
If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry as observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [Civil Appeal No. 990/68, decided on 15-07- 1968], the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, decided on April 29, 1969, hereafter ‘A.K. Kraipak’].- CLAT PG - 2024
- Jurisprudence
- The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognized and well defined by a catena of decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the promise must establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise.
Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law.
[Extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCC 193, decided on January 20, 2011, hereafter ‘Shree Sidhbali Steels’].- CLAT PG - 2024
- Laws of Contract
- In its second preliminary objection, Myanmar submits that The Gambia’s Application is inadmissible because The Gambia lacks standing to bring this case before the Court. In particular, Myanmar considers that only “injured States”, which Myanmar defines as States “adversely affected by an internationally wrongful act”, have standing to present a claim before the Court. In Myanmar’s view, The Gambia is not an “injured State” (a term that Myanmar appears to use interchangeably with the term “specially affected State”) and has failed to demonstrate an individual legal interest. Therefore, according to Myanmar, The Gambia lacks standing under Article IX of the Genocide Convention.
Myanmar draws a distinction between the right to invoke State responsibility under general international law and standing before the Court. It argues that, even if it were established that a “non-injured” Contracting Party to the Genocide Convention has the right to invoke another State’s responsibility for violations of the Convention, this would not necessarily entail the right to bring a case before the Court. To this end, Myanmar contends that there exists a difference between the common interest in the accomplishment of the purposes of the Genocide Convention and a State’s individual legal interest that may be enforce through the institution of proceedings before the Court. In Myanmar’s view, only States “specially affected” by an internationally wrongful act have standing to bring a claim before the Court.
Myanmar further submits that The Gambia’s claims are inadmissible in so far as they are not brought before the Court in accordance with the rule concerning the nationality of claims which, according to Myanmar, is reflected in Article 44 (a) of the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Myanmar asserts that the rule concerning the nationality of claims applies to the invocation of responsibility by both “injured” and “non injured” States and irrespective of whether the obligation breached is an erga omnes partes or erga omnes obligation. Consequently, in Myanmar’s view, The Gambia lacks standing to invoke Myanmar’s responsibility.- CLAT PG - 2024
- Public International Law
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