Comprehension
The Supreme Court of India has held that it is a cardinal principle of the law of contract that the offer and acceptance of an offer must be absolute. It can give no room for doubt. The offer and acceptance must be based or founded on three components, that is, certainty, commitment and communication. However, when the acceptor puts in a new condition while accepting the contract already signed by the proposer, the contract is not complete until the proposer accepts that condition, as held by the Court in Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui, [AIR 1972 SC 1242]. An acceptance with a variation is no acceptance. It is, in effect and substance, simply a counter proposal which must be accepted fully by the original proposer, before a contract is made.
Question: 1
Based on the given excerpt, which of the following judgments is related to acceptance of a conditional offer?
Based on the given excerpt, which of the following judgments is related to acceptance of a conditional offer?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, (2020) 8 SCC 1
- Padia Timber Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of Visakhapatnam Port Trust, (2021) 3 SCC 24.
- Sonu v. Sonu Yadav, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 286
- Akshay Kumar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 3 SCC 431.
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The Correct Option is B
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The correct option is (B) : Padia Timber Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of Visakhapatnam Port Trust, (2021) 3 SCC 24.
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The excerpt discusses acceptance with a variation being treated as a counter-proposal rather than a completed contract. The question asks which judgment concerns acceptance of a conditional offer.
- Option A: State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh is not a contract law precedent on conditional acceptance - it belongs to a different field of law altogether.
- Option B: Padia Timber Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of Visakhapatnam Port Trust directly deals with a tender acceptance that carried an additional condition attached to it. The Court examined whether such a qualified communication amounted to a valid acceptance or was, in substance, a counter-offer requiring fresh acceptance by the original party - the exact scenario the excerpt is drawn from.
- Option C: Sonu v. Sonu Yadav does not deal with conditional acceptance in contract formation.
- Option D: Akshay Kumar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) is unrelated to the law of offer and acceptance.
Only the Padia Timber case squarely addresses a conditional/qualified acceptance and its effect on contract formation, matching the principle in the excerpt.
Hence, the correct answer is (B) Padia Timber Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of Visakhapatnam Port Trust, (2021) 3 SCC 24.
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Question: 2
‘The acceptance must match with the terms of offer’. The given statement is known as
‘The acceptance must match with the terms of offer’. The given statement is known as
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel
- Doctrine of Privity of Contract
- Mirror Rule
- Postal Rule
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The Correct Option is C
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The correct option is (C) : Mirror Rule
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The statement to be classified is: "the acceptance must match with the terms of offer."
- Option A - Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel: This doctrine prevents a person from going back on a clear promise once another party has relied on it to their detriment. It has nothing to do with whether an acceptance matches the terms of an offer, so it does not fit.
- Option B - Doctrine of Privity of Contract: This doctrine concerns who can sue or be sued on a contract - generally only parties to it. It addresses the parties bound by a contract, not the content-matching between offer and acceptance, so it is also not the right fit.
- Option C - Mirror Rule: This is precisely the principle that an acceptance must be the exact counterpart of the offer, without any variation, addition or qualification - it must "mirror" the offer's terms for a contract to be formed. This matches the given statement exactly.
- Option D - Postal Rule: This rule fixes the moment a contract is complete when acceptance is sent by post, not whether the acceptance corresponds to the offer's terms - a different question altogether.
Only the Mirror Rule directly addresses the requirement that acceptance correspond exactly to the offer's terms.
Hence, the correct answer is (C) Mirror Rule.
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Question: 3
Which of the following judgments relates to postal rule in a contract?
Which of the following judgments relates to postal rule in a contract?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Central Inland Water Transport Corpn v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, AIR 1986 SC 1571.
- Kanchan Udyog Ltd. v. United Spirits Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 237.
- Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2017) 14 SCC 80
- Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. M/s. Girdharilal Parshottamdas, AIR 1966 SC 543.
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The Correct Option is D
Approach Solution - 1
The correct option is (D) : Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. M/s. Girdharilal Parshottamdas, AIR 1966 SC 543.
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The question asks which judgment concerns the postal rule of contract formation.
- Option A: Central Inland Water Transport Corpn v. Brojo Nath Ganguly concerns unconscionable and unfair contract terms in service conditions, not the mode or timing of acceptance by post.
- Option B: Kanchan Udyog Ltd. v. United Spirits Ltd. does not deal with the postal rule of acceptance.
- Option C: Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission concerns force majeure and frustration of contract, an entirely different area of contract law.
- Option D: Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. M/s. Girdharilal Parshottamdas is the leading Indian precedent that examines when a contract is complete where communication is instantaneous, and in doing so contrasts that position with the postal rule - under which a contract is complete the moment acceptance is posted, since the offeror is treated as having taken the risk of delay or loss in transmission through the post.
Since Bhagwandas Kedia is the case in which the Supreme Court discussed and applied the postal-rule principle as a point of contrast for instantaneous communication, it is the correct citation.
Hence, the correct answer is (D) Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. M/s. Girdharilal Parshottamdas, AIR 1966 SC 543.
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Question: 4
Based on the given excerpt, which of the following is correct?
Based on the given excerpt, which of the following is correct?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- If the acceptance is conditional, offer can be withdrawn at any moment until absolute acceptance has taken place.
- If the acceptance is conditional or is not final, then there is a concluded contract.
- If there is no concluded contract, still the liability to pay damages may arise
- If the acceptance is conditional, offer cannot be withdrawn at any moment until absolute acceptance has taken place.
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The Correct Option is A
Approach Solution - 1
The correct option is (A) : If the acceptance is conditional, offer can be withdrawn at any moment until absolute acceptance has taken place.
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The excerpt establishes that a conditional acceptance is, in substance, a counter-proposal and not a completed contract until the original proposer accepts the new condition. The question asks which statement follows correctly from this.
- Option A: If a conditional acceptance is only a counter-proposal, then no contract exists yet - the original offer has, in effect, not been finally accepted. Until the counter-proposal is itself accepted, the original offeror remains free to withdraw the offer at any time before absolute acceptance takes place. This follows directly from the excerpt's logic.
- Option B: This claims a concluded contract exists even where acceptance is conditional or not final. That directly contradicts the excerpt, which states such acceptance is "no acceptance" at all, merely a counter-proposal.
- Option C: This claims damages can arise even without a concluded contract, which is not addressed or supported by the excerpt - the excerpt is concerned with whether a contract is formed, not with damages in its absence.
- Option D: This claims the offer cannot be withdrawn once a conditional acceptance is made, which is the reverse of the correct position - since no binding contract yet exists, the offeror retains the freedom to withdraw until absolute, unqualified acceptance occurs.
Only option (A) is consistent with the excerpt's core proposition that a conditional acceptance is a mere counter-proposal, leaving the original offer open to withdrawal until it is absolutely accepted.
Hence, the correct answer is (A) If the acceptance is conditional, offer can be withdrawn at any moment until absolute acceptance has taken place.
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Question: 5
The University sent a letter regarding the offer of appointment to Mr. X at his postal address on June 10, 2021. However, Mr. X received a lead about the dispatch of offer of appointment from his friend, Mr. Y, who is an employee of the University. Upon knowing about the offer, Mr. X sent his acceptance through e-mail at the official e-mail id of the University. Later, due to restrictions guidelines issued by the appropriate authority during the COVID-19 pandemic, Mr. X failed to receive the letter sent by the University whereas, it was specifically mentioned that the communication for acceptance was to be sent in writing through postal service at the official address of the University and no other mode of communication would be accepted.
Based on the given facts, which of the following is correct?
The University sent a letter regarding the offer of appointment to Mr. X at his postal address on June 10, 2021. However, Mr. X received a lead about the dispatch of offer of appointment from his friend, Mr. Y, who is an employee of the University. Upon knowing about the offer, Mr. X sent his acceptance through e-mail at the official e-mail id of the University. Later, due to restrictions guidelines issued by the appropriate authority during the COVID-19 pandemic, Mr. X failed to receive the letter sent by the University whereas, it was specifically mentioned that the communication for acceptance was to be sent in writing through postal service at the official address of the University and no other mode of communication would be accepted.
Based on the given facts, which of the following is correct?
Based on the given facts, which of the following is correct?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- Acceptance before completion of delivery of offer is valid
- Acceptance before completion of delivery of offer is not valid.
- A contract is always valid irrespective of completion of offer.
- Acceptance by Mr. X results in a valid contract.
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The Correct Option is B
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The correct option is (B) : Acceptance before completion of delivery of offer is not valid.
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The facts specify that the University required acceptance in writing, sent by post, at its official address, and that no other mode would be accepted. Mr. X instead sent an email after learning informally from a friend that an offer had been dispatched, and the postal letter itself never reached him.
- Option A: This claims acceptance is valid even before delivery of the offer is complete. Since Mr. X only had informal knowledge of the offer through a third party and had not actually received the University's communication through the stipulated mode, treating his acceptance as valid at that stage would ignore the requirement that the offer must first be properly communicated before it can be accepted.
- Option B: This correctly reflects that acceptance given before the offer itself has been completely delivered through the agreed mode cannot be treated as valid - an offer must be communicated in full before it can be accepted, and informal knowledge of its dispatch is not the same as receiving it.
- Option C: This claims a contract is always valid irrespective of completion of the offer, which cannot be correct - completion of communication of the offer is a basic requirement for a valid acceptance to follow.
- Option D: This claims Mr. X's email acceptance results in a valid contract. But the University had expressly restricted acceptance to a specific mode - written communication by post - and excluded every other mode. An email acceptance, sent moreover before proper delivery of the offer, cannot satisfy this stipulation.
Given that the offer was never properly delivered to Mr. X and the University had excluded any mode other than post, his premature acceptance by email cannot be treated as valid.
Hence, the correct answer is (B) Acceptance before completion of delivery of offer is not valid.
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Question: 6
Which of the following is correct about acceptance of offer in a contract?
Which of the following is correct about acceptance of offer in a contract?
Updated On: Jul 10, 2026
- The intention of the offeree to accept may or may not be expressed with such certainty.
- An absolute and unqualified acceptance can never be inferred from the conduct of the offeree
- When there is a variation between the offer and acceptance even in respect of any material term, acceptance can be said to be absolute and it results in the formation of a legal contract
- An absolute and unqualified acceptance may be inferred from the conduct of the offeree
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The Correct Option is D
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The correct option is (D) : An absolute and unqualified acceptance may be inferred from the conduct of the offeree
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The question asks which statement correctly describes how acceptance of an offer can be established in a contract.
- Option A: This claims the offeree's intention to accept may or may not be expressed with certainty. But acceptance must be certain and unambiguous - an offeree's intention has to be expressed with sufficient certainty for a contract to be recognised, so leaving this optional misstates the requirement.
- Option B: This claims an absolute and unqualified acceptance can never be inferred from conduct, which is too rigid. Contract law recognises that conduct - such as acting in a manner consistent only with acceptance - can itself demonstrate an unqualified acceptance, without needing an express verbal or written statement.
- Option C: This claims that even where there is a material variation between offer and acceptance, the acceptance can still be treated as absolute and form a valid contract. This is incorrect - a material variation is precisely what prevents acceptance from being absolute, since it converts the response into a counter-proposal instead.
- Option D: This correctly recognises that an absolute and unqualified acceptance may be inferred from the offeree's conduct - for example, where the offeree acts in a manner that leaves no doubt that the offer has been accepted on its own terms, even without an explicit verbal or written communication to that effect.
Testing each statement, only option (D) correctly allows for conduct-based inference of an unqualified acceptance, consistent with settled contract law.
Hence, the correct answer is (D) An absolute and unqualified acceptance may be inferred from the conduct of the offeree.
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Top CLAT PG Questions
- Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)] - An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
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The only other submission which we are required to deal with before we part with this matter is the argument of the learned counsel for the State that in view of the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereafter ‘MMDRA’) which prohibits under Section 4 the carrying on of any mining activity in this country except in accordance with the permit, licence or mining lease as the case may be, granted under the Act, the appellants cannot claim any proprietary right in the sub-soil…
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“... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the ‘Factories Act’ PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, –
(1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week.
(2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour.
(3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM.
(4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees).”
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[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter ‘Lalita Kumari’)]
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