Constitutional Provisions
The President and Governors of India can make ordinances under Articles 123 and 213 of the Indian Constitution, respectively. This power lets the government create laws when Parliament or the State Legislature is not in session, allowing for quick action in urgent situations.
Article 123: President's Ordinance-Making Power
Article 213: Governor's Ordinance-Making Power
Judicial Interpretation and Critique
Judicial Decisions
Criticism and Abuse
Fraud on the Constitution
Concept and Implications
The term "fraud on the Constitution" describes the misuse of constitutional provisions in ways that violate the Constitution's spirit, particularly regarding ordinance-making power.
Conclusion
Ordinance-making power is essential for handling urgent issues when Parliament or the State Legislature is not in session. However, misuse, especially re-issuing ordinances, has been condemned by the judiciary as a "fraud on the Constitution."
To maintain the legislative process's integrity and uphold the separation of powers, ordinances should be used judiciously and rarely. Legislatures must carefully review ordinances, ensuring they are only used in real emergencies. Additionally, the judiciary must continue to check against abuse of this power to protect the constitutional framework and democracy.
This question is really asking how the Supreme Court has policed the misuse of ordinance-making power over time, culminating in the phrase "fraud on the Constitution." The clearest way to answer it is to trace the doctrine case by case rather than describe Articles 123 and 213 in isolation.
The power and its built-in limit:
Article 123 lets the President legislate by ordinance when Parliament is not in session and immediate action is needed; Article 213 gives the Governor the same power for a state legislature. Both are meant as emergency, stop-gap powers, not a parallel route to permanent law-making. Every ordinance must be placed before the legislature when it reassembles and lapses after six weeks unless disapproved earlier or replaced by an Act.
A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982):
The Supreme Court first upheld the ordinance power as a genuine legislative power, co-extensive with the legislature's own law-making power, and held it was open to a narrow form of judicial review, though the President's or Governor's satisfaction would rarely be questioned. This case established that the power was real but not immune from scrutiny.
D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987):
Bihar had re-issued the same ordinances repeatedly, in some cases for over a decade, without ever placing them before the Assembly for a vote. The Supreme Court held that repeated re-promulgation without legislative approval is a colourable exercise of power and a fraud on the Constitution, since it lets the executive govern permanently through ordinances while bypassing the legislature the Constitution actually trusts with law-making.
Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017):
A seven-judge Constitution Bench went further than Wadhwa. It held that an ordinance is not an independent, free-standing source of law; it is a conditional, emergency power meant to bridge a gap until the legislature can act. Re-promulgation without placing the ordinance before the House was again condemned as a fraud on the constitutional scheme. The Bench also held that an ordinance which lapses does not automatically leave behind permanent rights or liabilities; whether an action taken under a lapsed ordinance survives depends on a test of public interest and irreversibility, decided case by case, rather than being presumed to continue.
Evaluation:
Read together, the three cases show the doctrine tightening over time: Roy confirmed the power exists and is reviewable, Wadhwa named its abuse a fraud on the Constitution, and Krishna Kumar Singh closed the loophole of treating a lapsed ordinance's effects as permanent by default. The remaining risk is less about ordinances lapsing and more about legislatures with a dominant majority converting an ordinance into an Act with little real debate, which achieves the same bypass of scrutiny without technically breaking any of these rulings. That is a political discipline problem the courts cannot fully solve through judicial review alone.