List of top Microeconomics Questions on Game theory asked in IIT JAM EN

Consider a game of coexistence where everyone exhibits two kinds of behaviour: ‘Hawk’ and ‘Dove’. The possible set of payoffs is given as follows:

Let us consider a simultaneous game involving two players \(X\) and \(Y\). \(X\) has two strategies, namely ‘Top’ and ‘Bottom’, and \(Y\) has two strategies, namely ‘Left’ and ‘Right’. The payoff matrix is as given below. In payoff \((i,j)\), \(i\) and \(j\) refer to payoffs of \(X\) and \(Y\), respectively. Then, which one of the following statements is CORRECT?

Two people, 1 and 2, are engaged in a joint project. Person 𝑖∈{1,2} puts in effort 𝑥𝑖 (0≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 1), and incurs cost 𝐶_𝑖 (𝑥_𝑖 ) = 𝑥_𝑖 . The monetary outcome of the project is 4𝑥₁𝑥₂ which is split equally between them. Considering the situation as a strategic game, the set of all Nash Equilibria in pure strategies is

In a 3-player game, player 1 can choose either Up or Down as strategies. Player 2 can chose either Left or Right as strategies. Player 3 can choose either Table 1 or Table 2 as strategies.

Which of the following strategy profile(s) is/are Nash Equilibrium?

An industry has 3 firms (1, 2 and 3) in Cournot competition. They have no fixed costs, and their constant marginal costs are respectively\(c_1=\frac{9}{30} , 𝑐_2 =\frac{ 10}{30} , 𝑐_3 = \frac{11}{30} .\)
They face an industry inverse demand function 𝑃=1−𝑄, where 𝑃 is the market price and 𝑄 is the industry output (sum of outputs of the 3 firms). Suppose that 𝑄 𝑐 is the industry output under Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then (𝑄 ^𝑐 )⁻¹ is equal to _______ (in integer).