List of top Legal Studies Questions on Administrative Law asked in CLAT PG

The Supreme Court affirmed that it is a well-established principle of administrative law that an adjudicatory body cannot base its decision on any material unless the person against whom it is sought to be utilized has been apprised of it and given an opportunity to respond to it. The court noted from MP Jain & SN Jain’s treatise on Principles of Administrative Law that if the adjudicatory body is going to rely on any material, evidence or document for its decision against a party, then the same must be brought to his notice and he be given an opportunity to rebut it or comment thereon. It is regarded as a fundamental principle of natural justice that no material ought to be relied on against a party without giving him an opportunity to respond to the same... The right to know the material on which the authority is going to base its decision is an element of the right to defend oneself. If without disclosing any evidence to the party, the authority takes it into its consideration, and decides the matter against the party, then the decision is vitiated for it amounts to denial of a real and effective opportunity to the party to meet the case against him.
On the issue of the impact of such non-disclosure the Court referred to its earlier pronouncements and summarised the principles thus – A quasi-judicial authority has a duty to disclose the material that has been relied upon at the stage of adjudication. The actual test is whether the material that is required to be disclosed is relevant for purpose of adjudication. If it is, then the principles of natural justice require its due disclosure. The aggrieved person must be able to prove that prejudice has been caused to him due to non-disclosure. To prove prejudice, he must prove that had the material been disclosed to him the outcome or the punishment would have been different.
(Extract with Edits taken from in Deepak Ananda Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 11 SCC 130)

SEBI was established as India’s principal capital markets regulator with the aim to protect the interest of investors in securities and promote the development and regulation of the securities market in India. SEBI is empowered to regulate the securities market in India by the SEBI Act 1992, the SCRA and the Depositories Act 1996. SEBI’s powers to regulate the securities market are wide and include delegated legislative, administrative, and adjudicatory powers to enforce SEBI’s regulations. SEBI exercises its delegated legislative power by inter alia framing regulations and appropriately amending them to keep up with the dynamic nature of the securities’ market. SEBI has issued a number of regulations on various areas of security regulation which form the backbone of the framework governing the securities market in India.
Section 11 of the SEBI Act lays down the functions of SEBI and expressly states that it “shall be the duty of the Board to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate the securities market, by such measures as it thinks fit”. Further, Section 30 of the SEBI Act empowers SEBI to make regulations consistent with the Act. Significantly, while framing these regulations, SEBI consults its advisory committees consisting of domain experts, including market experts, leading market players, legal experts, technology experts, retired Judges of this Court or the High Courts, academicians, representatives of industry associations and investor associations. During the consultative process, SEBI also invites and duly considers comments from the public on their proposed regulations. SEBI follows similar consultative processes while reviewing and amending its regulations.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from the judgement in Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 171)

“The question can also be considered from another point of view. Supposing the police send a report viz. a charge-sheet, under Section 170 of the Code. As we have already pointed out, the Magistrate is not bound to accept that report, when he considers the matter judicially. But can he differ from the police and call upon them to submit a final report, under Section 169? In our opinion, the Magistrate has no such power. If he has no such power, in law, it also follows that the Magistrate has no power to direct the police to submit a charge-sheet, when the police have submitted a final report that no case is made out for sending the accused for trial. The functions of the Magistracy and the police, are entirely different, and though, in the circumstances mentioned earlier, the Magistrate may or may not accept the report, and take suitable action, according to law, he cannot certainly infringe upon the jurisdiction of the police, by compelling them to change their opinion, so as to accord with his view. Therefore, to conclude, there is no power, expressly or impliedly conferred, under the Code, on a Magistrate to call upon the police to submit a charge-sheet, when they have sent a report under Section 169 of the Code, that there is no case made out for sending up an accused for trial.”
[Extracted from Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, (1967) 3 SCR 668, para 19-20].

In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter ‘Lalita Kumari’)]

The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that when it comes to information contained in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf - Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose. However, Section 65B(1) clearly differentiates between the “original” document - which would be the original “electronic record” contained in the “computer” in which the original information is first stored and the computer output containing such information, which then may be treated as evidence of the contents of the “original” document. All this necessarily shows that Section 65B differentiates between the original information contained in the “computer” itself and copies made therefrom – the former being primary evidence, and the latter being secondary evidence.
Quite obviously, the requisite certificate in sub-section (4) of the Indian Evidence Act is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, a computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where “the computer”, as defined, happens to be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network” (as defined in the Information Technology Act, 2000) and it becomes impossible to physically bring such network or system to the Court, then the only means of proving information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65B(4). This being the case, it is necessary to clarify what is contained in the last sentence in paragraph 24 of Anvar P.V. (supra) which reads as “... if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act ...”. This may more appropriately be read without the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, ...”. With this minor clarification, the law stated in paragraph 24 of Anvar P.V. (supra) does not need to be revisited.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by R.F. Nariman, J., in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash K. Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1.]

The Supreme Court of India in a Suo Motu Writ Petition In Re: Distribution of Essential Supplies and Services During Pandemic, [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2021], analyzed the power of judicial review over the management of the COVID-19 pandemic in India. The Union of India has highlighted a few concerns as: The executive is battling an unprecedented crisis and the government needs discretion to formulate policy in larger interest and its wisdom should be trusted; The current vaccine policy conforms to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, and requires no interference from the courts as the executive has room for free play in the joints while dealing with a pandemic of this magnitude; Judicial review over executive policies is permissible only on account of manifest arbitrariness. No interference from judicial proceedings is called for when the executive is operating on expert medical and scientific opinion to tackle a medical crisis; and any over-zealous judicial intervention, though well-meaning, in the absence of expert advice or administrative experience may lead to unintended circumstances where the executive is left with little room to explore innovative solutions. The court clarified that in the context of the public health emergency, the executive has been given a wider margin in enacting measures which ordinarily may have violated the liberty of individual. The judiciary has also recognized that Constitutional scrutiny is transformed during such public health emergencies and noted the complex role of the government in battling public health emergencies in following words: ...While this court should guard with firmness every right appertaining to life, liberty or property as secured to the individual by the Supreme Law of the Land, it is of the last importance that it should not invade the domain of local authority except when it is plainly necessary to do so in order to enforce that law. But even in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten and a public health emergency does not give Governors and other public officials carte blanche to disregard the Constitution for as long as the medical problem persists. …the courts should expect policies that more carefully account for Constitutional rights. The court stated that separation of powers is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. However, this separation of powers does not result in courts lacking jurisdiction in conducting a judicial review of these policies.

"The main argument on behalf of the Respondents was that the Government was bound by its promise and could not have resiled from it. They had an indefeasible legitimate expectation of continued employment, stemming from the Government Order dated 20.02.2002 which could not have been withdrawn. It was further submitted on behalf of the Respondents that they were not given an opportunity before the benefit that was promised, was taken away. To appreciate this contention of the Respondents, it is necessary to understand the concept of legitimate expectation. 14. The principle of legitimate expectation has been recognized by this Court in ―Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation & Ors.‖ If the promise made by an authority is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous, a person can claim that the authority in all fairness should not act contrary to the promise.
15. M. Jagannadha Rao, J. elaborately elucidated on legitimate expectation in ―Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.‖ He referred to the judgment in 2 (1993) 3 SCC 499 ―Council of Civil Service Unions and Ors. v. Minister for the Civil Service‖ in which Lord Diplock had observed that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which, (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision- maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn. 
Rao, J. observed in this case, that the procedural part of legitimate expectation relates to a representation that a hearing or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the decision is made. The substantive part of the principle is that if a representation is made that a benefit of a substantive nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit, that it will be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could be enforced. 
16. It has been held by R. V. Raveendran, J. in ―Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar‖ that legitimate expectation is not a legal right. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. It may entitle an expectant: (a) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or (b) to an explanation as to the cause of denial. In appropriate cases, the Courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice."
Source: Excerpt taken from the judgment delivered by the bench of L. Nageshwar Rao & Hemant Gupta, J.J. in Kerala State Beverages (M and M) v. P P Suresh & Ors.,(2019) 9 SCC 710.

Doctrine of legitimate expectation and wednesbury principles were read by Supreme Court into: