List of top Legal Studies Questions on Criminal Procedure asked in CLAT PG

Having heard the learned Counsels for the parties, and on perusal of the ma terial on record, the primary issue which arises for consideration of this Court is ”whether a review or recall of an order passed in a criminal proceeding initiated under section 340 of CrPC is permissible or not?” [...] A careful consideration of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid decisions of this Court clarify the now-well settled position of jurisprudence of Section 362 of CrPC which when summarized would be that the criminal courts, as envisaged under the CrPC, are barred from altering or reviewing in their own judgments except for the exceptions which are explicitly provided by the statute, namely, correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error that might have been committed or the said power is provided under any other law for the time being in force. As the courts become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable. Despite the powers provided under Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the courts to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar. It also stands clarified that it is only in situations wherein an application for recall of an order or judgment seeking a procedural review that the bar would not apply and not a substantive review where the bar as contained in Section 362 CrPC is attracted. Numerous decisions of this Court have also elaborated that the bar under said provision is to be applied stricto sensu. 
(Extracted with edits and revisions from Vikram Bakshi v. RP Khosla 2025 INSC 1020)

In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.

[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter ‘Lalita Kumari’)]
Section 304-B(1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) defines “dowry death” of a woman. It provides that “dowry death” is where the death of a woman is caused by burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, in connection with a demand for dowry.

Further, Section 304-B(2) of IPC provides punishment for the aforesaid offence. The Supreme Court of India summarized the law under Section 304-B of IPC and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) as under:
  1. Section 304-B of IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.
  2. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B of IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B of IEA, operates against the accused.
  3. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-B of IPC cannot be construed to mean “immediately before”. The prosecution must establish the existence of a “proximate and live link” between the cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives and the consequential death of the victim.
In Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 382, the Court analysed the ambit of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and also the scope of the expression “arrest” contained therein and under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Arrest may be classified into two categories, namely, arrest under a warrant issued by a court and arrest without warrant. Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly directs that the investigation should be completed in the first instance within 24 hours; if not, the arrested person should be brought before a Magistrate as provided under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Turning now to Article 22(1) and (2), we must ascertain whether its protection extends to both categories of arrests mentioned above, and, if not, then which one of them comes within its protection. There can be no doubt that arrests without warrants issued by a court call for greater protection than arrests under such warrants. The provision that the arrested person should within 24 hours be produced before the nearest Magistrate is particularly desirable in the case of arrest otherwise than under a warrant issued by the court, for it ensures the immediate application of a judicial mind to the legal authority of the person making the arrest and the regularity of the procedure adopted by him.

In the case of arrest under a warrant issued by a court, the judicial mind had already been applied to the case when the warrant was issued and, therefore, there is less reason for making such production in that case a matter of a substantive fundamental right. The matter of “House Arrest” was deliberated by the Court as:
“There can be no quarrel with the proposition that a court cannot remand a person unless the court is authorised to do so by law. We are of the view that, in the facts of this case, the house arrest was not ordered purporting to be under Section 167. We observe that under Section 167 in appropriate cases it will be open to courts to order house arrest.”