List of practice Questions

Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)]

An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’]

The other material which prompted the High Court to reach the conclusion that the subsoil/minerals vest in the State is … recitals of a patta which ….. states that if minerals are found in the property covered by the patta and if the pattadar exploits those minerals, the pattadar is liable for a separate tax in addition to the tax shown in the patta and …. certain standing orders of the Collector of Malabar which provided for collection of seigniorage fee in the event of the mining operation being carried on. We are of the clear opinion that the recitals in the patta or the Collector’s standing order that the exploitation of mineral wealth in the patta land would attract additional tax, in our opinion, cannot in any way indicate the ownership of the State in the minerals. The power to tax is a necessary incident of sovereign authority (imperium) but not an incident of proprietary rights (dominium). Proprietary right is a compendium of rights consisting of various constituent, rights. If a person has only a share in the produce of some property, it can never be said that such property vests in such a person. In the instant case, the State asserted its ‘right’ to demand a share in the ‘produce of the minerals worked’ though the expression employed is right – it is in fact the Sovereign authority which is asserted. From the language of the BSO No.10 it is clear that such right to demand the share could be exercised only when the pattadar or somebody claiming through the pattadar, extracts/works the minerals – the authority of the State to collect money on the happening of an event – such a demand is more in the nature of an excise duty/a tax. The assertion of authority to collect a duty or tax is in the realm of the sovereign authority, but not a proprietary right….
The only other submission which we are required to deal with before we part with this matter is the argument of the learned counsel for the State that in view of the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereafter ‘MMDRA’) which prohibits under Section 4 the carrying on of any mining activity in this country except in accordance with the permit, licence or mining lease as the case may be, granted under the Act, the appellants cannot claim any proprietary right in the sub-soil…
[Extract from the judgment in Thressiamma Jacob v. Dept. of Mining & Geology, (2013) 9 SCC 725] (hereafter ‘T Jacob’)

A nationwide lockdown was declared by the Central Government from 24 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity came to a grinding halt. The lockdown was extended on several occasions, among them for the second time on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the Labour and Employment Department of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 5 of the Factories Act to exempt all factories registered under the Act “from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers” under Sections 51, 54, 55 and 56. The stated aim of the notification was to provide “certain relaxations for industrial and commercial activities” from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020.
Section 5 of the Factories Act provides that in a public emergency, the State Government can exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of the Act, except Section 67. Section 5 is extracted below: “5. Power to exempt during public emergency. — In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act except section 67 for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: Provided that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section ‘public emergency’ means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance.” (emphasis supplied) The notification in its relevant part is extracted below:
“... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the ‘Factories Act’ PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, –
(1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week.
(2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour.
(3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM.
(4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees).”
[Extract from judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. The State of Gujarat decided on 1 October, 2020, (hereafter ‘GMS’)]

In view of various counter claims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of a FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register a FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of a FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Sathasivam, C.J.I. in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (hereafter ‘Lalita Kumari’)]

The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that when it comes to information contained in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf - Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose. However, Section 65B(1) clearly differentiates between the “original” document - which would be the original “electronic record” contained in the “computer” in which the original information is first stored and the computer output containing such information, which then may be treated as evidence of the contents of the “original” document. All this necessarily shows that Section 65B differentiates between the original information contained in the “computer” itself and copies made therefrom – the former being primary evidence, and the latter being secondary evidence.
Quite obviously, the requisite certificate in sub-section (4) of the Indian Evidence Act is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, a computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where “the computer”, as defined, happens to be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network” (as defined in the Information Technology Act, 2000) and it becomes impossible to physically bring such network or system to the Court, then the only means of proving information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65B(4). This being the case, it is necessary to clarify what is contained in the last sentence in paragraph 24 of Anvar P.V. (supra) which reads as “... if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act ...”. This may more appropriately be read without the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, ...”. With this minor clarification, the law stated in paragraph 24 of Anvar P.V. (supra) does not need to be revisited.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by R.F. Nariman, J., in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash K. Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1.]

There are two different ways we can think about law and law-making. To put it crudely: we can think of law as partisan, as nothing more than the expression in legislative terms of the particular ideology or policies of a political party; or we can think of law as neutral, as something that stands above party politics, at least in the sense that once passed it ought to command the obedience and respect of everyone...
[Political] Parties compete for control of Parliament because they want their values, their ideology, and their programme to be reflected in the law of the land… …no-one doubts that the Commons stage is the most important, and the reason surely is that the House of Commons is the institution most subject to popular control. If laws passed by one Parliament turn out to be unpopular, the electorate can install a majority that is sworn to repeal them. That is what elections and representative politics are all about. On this model, it is simply fatuous to pretend that law is somehow ‘above’ politics. Maybe there are some laws on which everyone agrees, no matter what their ideology. Everyone agrees there should be a law against murder, for example, and that there should be basic rules of the road. But as soon as we turn to the fine print, it is surprisingly difficult to find a consensus on the detail of any legislative provision. And in many cases, even the fundamental principles are the subject of fierce political dispute… What this model stresses, then, is that legislative attitudes are necessarily partisan attitudes. So long as there is tight party discipline in Parliament, legislative decisions will be taken on the basis of the ideology of the leadership of the party in power. The partisan model stresses the legitimacy of these attitudes and this form of decision-making…
By contrast, what I call ‘the neutral model’ enjoins a certain respect for law and lawmaking which goes beyond purely partisan views. According to this model there is something special about law, and it carries with it special non-partisan responsibilities. Proponents of the neutral model do not deny that laws are made by party politicians, and that legislation is often motivated by disputed values and ideologies… …their view is that when a law is being made, something solemn is being decided in Parliament in the name of the whole society. Though it is reasonable for bills to be proposed and debated along partisan lines, the decision procedures of Parliament are designed to indicate not merely which is the stronger party, but what is to be the view of society as a whole on some matter for the time being… …the result, the outcome, is a decision of the House as a whole: it is, literally, an act of Parliament, not merely an act of the Conservative party or an act of the Labour party, whichever commands the majority. By virtue of the parliamentary process, it transcends partisan politics, and presents itself as a norm enacted for and on behalf of the entire community…
…on the neutral model, the social function idea tends to receive more emphasis than the political provenance. For this reason, the neutral model often focuses on aspects of the legal system that do not involve explicitly partisan initiatives. It focuses on those areas of law where there is something approaching unanimity (such as the fundamental principles of the criminal law and some of the basic tenets of private law). And it focuses particularly on ‘the common law’... ...when common law doctrine strikes out in new directions, the change is usually presented as the product of reasoning which is independent of politics, as though there were an evolving ‘logic’ of the law which could proceed untainted by partisan values or ideology.
[Excerpted, with edits, from The Law, by Jeremy Waldron, Routledge, Oxon, 1990.]

…If a person enters into a transaction which is surely likely to result in loss, he cannot be accused of insider trading. In other words, the actual gain or loss is immaterial, but the motive for making a gain is essential.
The words, “likely to materially affect the price” appearing in the main part of Regulation 2(ha) gain significance for the simple reason that profit motive, if not actual profit should be the motivating factor for a person to indulge in insider trading. This is why the information in Item No.(vii) of the Explanation under Regulation 2(ha) may have to be examined with reference to the words “likely to materially affect the price”. Keeping this in mind let us now come back to the facts of the case.
Gammon Infrastructure Projects Limited (“GIPL”) was awarded a contract for the execution of a project, whose total cost was admittedly ₹ 1,648 crores. Simplex Infrastructure Limited (“SIL”) was awarded a contract for a project whose cost was ₹ 940 crores. Both GIPL and SIL created Special Purpose Vehicles and then they entered into two shareholders Agreements. Under these Agreements, GIPL and SIL will have to make investments in the Special Purpose Vehicles created by each other, in such a manner that each of them will hold 49% equity interest in the other’s project.
It means that GIPL could have acquired 49% equity interest in the project worth ₹ 940 crores and SIL would have acquired 49% equity interest in a project worth ₹ 1,648 crore.
In arithmetical terms, the acquisition by GIPL, of an equity interest in SIL’s project was worth ₹ 460 crores approximately. Similarly, the acquisition by SIL, of the equity interest in GIPL’s project was worth ₹ 807.52 crores. Therefore, the cancellation of the shareholders Agreements resulted in GIPL gaining very hugely in terms of order book value. In such circumstances an ordinary man of prudence would expect an increase in the value of the shares of GIPL and would wait for the market trend to show itself up, if he actually desired to indulge in insider trading. But the respondent did not wait for the information about the market trend, after the information became public. The reason given by him, which is also accepted by the Whole-Time Member (“WTM”) and the Tribunal is that he had to dispose of his shares as well as certain other properties for the purpose of honouring a Corporate Debt Restructuring (“CDR”) package. It is on record that if the CDR package had not gone through successfully, the parent company of GIPL namely, Gammon India Ltd., could have gone for bankruptcy.
Therefore, the Tribunal was right in thinking that the respondent had no motive or intention to make undeserved gains by encashing on the unpublished price sensitive information that he possessed.
As a matter of fact, the Tribunal found that the closing price of shares rose, after the disclosure of the information. This shows that the unpublished price sensitive information was such that it was likely to be more beneficial to the shareholders, after the disclosure was made. Any person desirous of indulging in insider trading, would have waited till the information went public, to sell his holdings. The respondent did not do this, obviously on account of a pressing necessity.
[Excerpted from the judgment delivered by Ramasubramanian, J., in Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Abhijit Rajan, CA No. 563 of 2020 (hereafter ‘A Rajan’)]

The Russian Federation’s specific claims alleging genocide, and invoking that alleged genocide as the basis for military action against Ukraine, include:
a. On 21 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation stated in an official address that there was a “genocide” occurring in Ukraine, “which almost 4 million people are facing.”…
b. The President of the Russian Federation then announced a “special military operation” and stated that “[t]he purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime.”…
c. In an interview on 25 February 2022, the Russian Ambassador to the European Union was asked about President Putin’s reference to genocide as justification for Russia’s unlawful acts against Ukraine and said “[w]e can turn to the official term of genocide as coined in international law. If you read the definition it fits pretty well.”…
Therefore, the parties’ dispute over first, the existence of acts of genocide, and second, Russia’s claim to legal authority to take military action in and against Ukraine to punish and prevent such alleged genocide, is a dispute that concerns the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the [1] Convention. Accordingly, the Court should recognize its jurisdiction on a prima facie basis for purposes of indicating provisional measures.
[Excerpted from: Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures Submitted by Ukraine, February 26, 2022, in Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), International Court of Justice]

Food Corporation of India (“FCI” or “Corporation”), the Appellant herein, procures and distributes foodgrains across the length and breadth of the country as a part of its statutory duties. In the process, it enters into many contracts with transport contractors. In one such contract, the subject matter of present appeals, the Corporation empowered itself (under clause XII (a)) to recover damages, losses, charges, costs and other expenses suffered due to the contractors’ negligence from the sums payable to them. The short question arising for consideration is whether the demurrages imposed on the Corporation by the Railways can be, in turn, recovered by the Corporation from the contractors as “charges” recoverable under clause XII (a) of the contract. In other words, does contractors’ liability for “charges”, if any, include demurrages?
“XII [Road Transport Contract]. Recovery of losses suffered by the Corporation (a) The Corporation shall be at liberty to reimburse themselves for any damages, losses, charges, costs or expenses suffered or incurred by them, or any amount payable by the Contractor as Liquidated Damages as provided in Clauses X above….”
Interpretation of contracts concerns the discernment of the true and correct intention of the parties to it. Words and expressions used in the contract are principal tools to ascertain such intention. While interpreting the words, courts look at the expressions falling for interpretation in the context of other provisions of the contract and also in the context of the contract as a whole. These are intrinsic tools for interpreting a contract. As a principle of interpretation, courts do not resort to materials external to the contract for construing the intention of the parties. There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule excluding reference or reliance on external sources to interpret a contract. One such exception is in the case of a latent ambiguity, which cannot be resolved without reference to extrinsic evidence. Latent ambiguity exists when words in a contract appear to be free from ambiguity; however, when they are sought to be applied to a particular context or question, they are amenable to multiple outcomes….”. It observed that “….Extrinsic evidence, in cases of latent ambiguity, is admissible both to ascertain where necessary, the meaning of the words used, and to identify the objects to which they are to be applied.
The Corporation in the present contract has chosen not to include the power to recover demurrages and as such the expression “charges” cannot be interpreted to include demurrages. Demurrage is undoubtedly a charge, however, such a textual understanding would not help us decipher the true and correct intention of the parties to the present contract”. After examining the contract in its entirety, including its nature and scope, the Court concluded that the contractors’ liability in the present contract was clearly distinguishable from other contracts entered into by the Corporation in 2010 and 2018, which included loading and unloading of foodgrains from the railway wagons within the scope of contractors’ duties, thereby necessitating the inclusion of demurrages as a penalty for non-performance of contractual duties.
[Extracted from: Food Corporation of India v. Abhijit Paul, (CA 8572-8573/2022). Judgment of Justices A.S. Bopanna and P.S. Narasimha, 18 November 2022]

The Plaintiff is a world-renowned company, carrying on business in the field of sealants and adhesives, construction and paint chemicals, art materials, industrial adhesives, industrial and textile resins and organic pigments and preparations since at least 1969. The mark M-SEAL was conceived and adopted by the Plaintiff’s predecessors in title… in or about the year 1968, and has been continuously, extensively and in an uninterrupted manner used since then.
The said mark and the artistic representation thereof have been acquired by the Plaintiff pursuant to agreement dated 27 March 2000, together with the goodwill thereof and the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the mark M-SEAL and/or marks consisting of M-SEAL as one of its leading, essential and distinctive features.
Plaintiff’s earliest trade mark registration bearing no. 282168 [is] in respect of the mark M-SEAL, dated 16th August 1972, claiming use from 1st December 1968… The registrations are valid and subsisting and the entries appearing on the register of trade marks including the dates of use thus constitute prima facie evidence of such facts.
It is stated that the Plaintiff's M-SEAL registration bearing No. […] contains a disclaimer with regard to the word PHATAPHAT, however the mark as a whole is registered and to that extent all features taken as a whole stand protected by the registration. Further, it is stated that registration bearing no. […] contains a disclaimer with regard to the word SEAL and the registrations bearing nos. […] have a condition imposed on it viz “Registration of this trade mark shall give no right to the exclusive use of all other descriptive matters appearing on the label”. However, the Plaintiff states that these conditions do not limit the rights of the Plaintiff including for reasons set out hereinafter and in any event the rest of the M-SEAL registrations have no conditions/limitations.
The unique and distinctive artistic representation of M-SEAL i.e., (including in particular the unique line below the mark which is an extension from the first letter of the mark) as well as the M-SEAL Labels are original artistic works in respect of which copyrights subsist and such copyrights are owned by the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff states that in or about December 2020, the Plaintiff was shocked and surprised to come across sealant products of the Defendant being sold under the mark R-SEAL, which mark is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s registered trade mark M-SEAL... The said product of the Defendant is identical to the M-SEAL product of the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s product also bears an impugned packaging/labels/ trade dress which is a reproduction of and/or in appearance, almost identical or deceptively similar to the M-SEAL products of the Plaintiff, and the M-SEAL Labels… The impugned products of the Defendant also bear the impugned identification mark JHAT-PAT that is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s identification mark PHATAPHAT.
In comparing rival marks / labels to consider whether they are similar, the Supreme Court in Cadilla Healthcare Limited v. Cadilla Pharmaceuticals Limited, 2001 (2) PTC 541 SC10 lays down that attention and stress is to be given to the common features in the two rather than on differences in essential features.
[Source: Pidilite Industries Limited v. Riya Chemy 1-IA (L) 15502 of 2021 in Comm. IP. Su. 147 of 2022. Decision of Justice R. I. Chagla of the Bombay High Court, 11 November, 2022]

The philosophy of Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) has had a long-standing history in India. India is one of the first countries in the world to create a legal framework on CSR and statutorily mandate companies to report on the same. It emanates from the Gandhian principles of trusteeship and giving back to the society. The intent of the law is to mainstream the practice of business involvement in CSR and make it socially, economically and environmentally responsible.
The Companies Act, 2013 (the ‘Act’) mandates companies meeting a certain minimum threshold in terms of turnover/net worth/net profit to undertake CSR activities as per Schedule VII of the Act. Schedule VII specifies the areas or subjects to be undertaken by the company as CSR activities. These areas broadly align with national priorities and relate to sustainable and inclusive development. The Act does not recognise any expenditure on areas/activities outside of Schedule VII as CSR expenditure. Companies (CSR Policy) Rules, 2014 prescribes the operational framework and manner in which companies should comply with CSR provisions under the Act. The mode of implementation of CSR activities, content of CSR policy, impact assessment, reporting requirements and disclosure for CSR are covered under these Rules. The CSR architecture is disclosure-based and CSR-mandated companies are required to file details of CSR activities annually in the MCA-21 registry in e-form AOC-4.
A High-Level Committee set up in 2018 to review the CSR framework recommended that Schedule VII of the Act be mapped with Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’). The Committee noted that companies need to balance CSR spending between local area/areas around where it operates, and less developed regions such as aspirational districts.
The Government of India launched the ‘Transformation of Aspirational Districts’ programme (‘ADP’) in January 2018 with the aim to improve [the] socio-economic status of the least developed regions across India. The programme is based on five socio-economic themes such as – Health & Nutrition, Education, Agriculture and Water Resources, Financial Inclusion and Skill Development and improvement of basic infrastructure… As on date, 112 aspirational districts are recognised by the Government wherein Jharkhand has the highest number of aspirational districts i.e., 19 followed by Bihar (13), Odisha and Chhattisgarh (10 each). The Government has been taking various initiatives to encourage CSR in aspirational districts and to remove regional disparities.
[Source: Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India “Compendium on Corporate Social Responsibility in India” (2021)]